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Abstract—Endorsing Bill Readings’ argument that there is an intimate relationship between the dissolution of 
the nation-State, the undermining of the Humboldtian ideal of the university and economic globalization, this 
paper defends both the nation-State and the Humboldtian university as core institutions of democracy. However, 
such an argument only has force, it is suggested, if we can revive an appreciation of the real meaning of 
democracy. Endorsing Cornelius Castoriadis’ argument that democracy has been betrayed in the modern world 
but disagreeing with his analysis of modernity, it is argued that the tradition of modern democratic thought can 
only be properly comprehended in relation to the ‘radical enlightenment’ originating in the Renaissance, efforts to 
subvert this by the ‘moderate enlightenment’, and the revival and reformulation of the radical enlightenment in 
Germany at the end of the eighteenth century. It is shown that subsequent political thought only becomes fully 
intelligible in relation to the on-going struggle between the radical and the moderate enlightenments, and that it is 
necessary to appreciate that the moderate enlightenment, manifesting itself in neo-liberal thought, is profoundly 
anti-democratic. While the radical enlightenment was developed in the nineteenth century by philosophical 
idealists, it is suggested that the achievements of the idealists can be successfully defended now only on 
naturalistic foundations through process metaphysics. Process metaphysics, it is shown, provides the basis for 
reviving the Humboldtian model of the university, the democratic nation-State, and a vision of the future as 
‘communities of communities’ to counter the dissolution of all communities into the global market promoted by 
neo-liberals. 
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The University is in ruins, claimed Bill Readings 
in a book encapsulating this claim in the title.1 
This work is of major significance not only 
because it accurately portrayed the malaise of 
universities at the time it was written more than a 
decade ago, but because of its prescience in 
characterizing how they would evolve. This 
prescience seems to vindicate his diagnosis of the 
basic cause of this malaise. Not only is ‘the 
professoriat being proletarianized’, but 
universities are suffering ‘an external 
 
1 Bill Readings, The University in Ruins, Cambridge, Mass., 
Harvard University Press, 1996. 
legitimation crisis’. The University ‘is no longer 
linked to the destiny of the nation-state by virtue 
of its role as a producer, protector, and inculcator 
of an idea of national culture.’2 Without this role, 
the University ‘no longer participates in the 
historical project for humanity that was the 
legacy of the Enlightenment: the historical 
project of culture.’3 Instead, ‘the University is 
becoming a transnational bureaucratic 
corporation’.4 By providing ‘a structural 
 
2 Ibid., p.3. 
3 Ibid., p.5. 
4 Ibid., p.3. 
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diagnosis of contemporary shifts in the 
University’s function as an institution’, Readings 
showed that it is ‘no longer clear what the place 
for the University is within society nor what the 
exact nature of that society is’. Thus ‘the wider 
social role of the university is now up for grabs.’5 
Readings argued that all this has been brought 
about by the process of economic globalization.6  
To explain why economic globalization has had 
such an impact, Readings traced the roots of the 
modern university to the ideas promulgated by 
von Humboldt on the establishment of the 
University of Berlin. In opposition to those who 
have looked upon the Humboldtian University as 
just one model among others, Readings showed 
how the Humboldtian model virtually defined the 
modern university, having been taken up, 
although with variations unique in each case, by 
France, Britain and the United States as well as 
Germany.7 The Humboldtian University linked 
the University to the nation-State as an apparatus 
to produce national subjects by developing the 
national culture. With economic globalization, 
the State is being reduced to a bureaucratic 
apparatus of management without need for 
national subjects. As Readings noted, ‘the 
capitalist system in its contemporary form offers 
people not a national identity … but a non-
ideological belonging: a corporate identity in 
which they participate only at the price of 
becoming operatives.’8 Since ‘the economic is no 
longer subjugated to the political’,9 social 
 
5 Ibid., p.1f.. 
6 In this Readings was influenced by Masao Miyoshi’s ‘A 
Borderless World? From Colonialism to Transnationalism 
and the Decline of the Nation-State, Critical Inquiry, 
Vol.19, no.4, Summer, 1993, pp.726-751. Miyoshi took up 
these issues again in ‘”Globalization,” Culture, and the 
University’, The Cultures of Globalization, ed. Fredric 
Jameson and Masao Miyoshi, Durham, Duke University 
Press, 1998, pp.247-270, criticizing Readings proposed 
‘solution’, but not his analysis of the situation. 
7 The French utilitarian model which emerged from the 
French revolution was a rival, but it led to intellectual 
stagnation and was eclipsed and subsumed under the 
Humboldtian model. The Newman model was never a real 
rival and was more important for corrupting and weakening 
the Humboldtian model, making it more vulnerable to 
attack. The American business model, now being revived in 
a more aggressive form, had already revealed its 
inadequacies when it was attacked by Veblen in The Higher 
Learning in America in 1918 (republished with an 
introduction by Ivar Berg, New Brunswick, Transaction 
Publishers, 1993). 
8 Readings, The University in Ruins, p.48. 
9 Ibid., p.46 
meaning no longer resides in the political 
question of ‘what kind of state can establish the 
just society and realize human destiny’ but ‘in an 
economic sphere outside the political competence 
of the state.’10 Hence, we have consumerism. 
Consumerism ‘is the economic counterpart of the 
hollowing out of political subjectivity that 
accompanies the decline of the nation-state. ... It 
is the sign that the individual is no longer a 
political entity, is not a subject of the nation-
state.’11 When ‘the  individual is positioned as a 
consumer without memory, a gaping mouth, as it 
were, rather than as the subject of a narrative of 
self-realization’12,  when the individual is no 
longer a subject of the nation-State, there is no 
need for the Humboldtian University.  
The strength of Readings’ analysis lies in his 
appreciation of the relationship between the 
Humboldtian University, the nation-State and the 
Enlightenment, of the centrality of the notion of 
culture to comprehending this relationship, and of 
the threat posed to the nation-State, the historical 
project of Enlightenment and along with these, 
the Humboldtian University, by economic global-
ization; the weaknesses, astonishing given his 
analysis, are manifest in an insufficient 
appreciation of the Humboldtian University and 
all that it stood for. Despite brilliant analyses and 
stirring passages suggesting a deep appreciation 
of what is at stake, Readings was too willing to 
give up on the Humboldtian University and to 
reconciling us to living in its ruins. In this paper, 
I will argue that what the Humboldtian 
University stood for the struggle for democracy 
in the modern world. Not only does Readings 
appear to have failed to appreciate the connection 
between education, the nation-State and 
democracy, he appears to have failed to 
appreciate the deeper meaning of historical 
project of Enlightenment as the struggle for 
freedom, and what it means to have this project 
undermined. In this failure, I will argue, he is 
symptomatic of the malaise he appeared to have 
diagnosed, a malaise which afflicts even those 
who have appreciated the relationship between 
education and democracy. In this regard I will 
examine the work of Henry and Susan Giroux 
and Cornelius Castoriadis, showing how these 
thinkers for different reasons have failed to 
 
10 Ibid., p.48. 
11 Ibid., p.48.. 
12 Ibid., p.143. 
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appreciate the importance of the Humboldtian 
University to democracy. If someone as acute as 
Readings has, despite appearances, failed to 
grasp the immensity of the destruction being 
wrought by economic globalization, and thinkers 
as acute as the Girouxs and Castoriadis have 
failed to appreciate the importance of the 
Humboldtian University to democracy in the 
modern world, this I will argue does not justify 
dismissing the historical project represented by 
the Humboldtian University; it calls for a deeper 
examination to explain how the ‘historical project 
of culture’ has been lost in order to revive it. 
 
LACUNAE IN READINGS’ ANALYSIS 
Where did Readings’ analysis go astray? Despite 
efforts to avoid the blinkered perspectives of 
other critics of universities, Readings’ analysis 
was limited by his own discipline of cultural 
studies and comparative literature. The University 
in Ruins provides an insightful analysis of the 
development of the disciplines of literature, 
cultural studies and multiculturalism absent in 
most of the writings of other literary and cultural 
theorists who have complained about what is 
happening to universities without appreciating 
the rationale for their existence in the first 
place.13 While taking his own discipline as his 
point of departure, Readings did acknowledge the 
significance of other disciplines. He noted for 
instance the characterization of the goal of 
undergraduate education in physics by a Nobel 
laureate as introducing students to ‘the culture of 
physics’, noting that the contested status of 
knowledge in physics ‘requires a model of 
knowledge as a conversation among a 
community rather than as a simple accumulation 
of facts.’14 This is entirely in accordance with the 
Humboldtian idea of the university. Readings 
also noted that funding for science was under 
threat.15 Yet Readings is still open to the charge 
that his dramatic title reflects the fall in standing 
of literature and the other humanities disciplines, 
and it is open to the defenders of the new order to 
claim that the new corporate university is more 
efficient. By forcing universities to respond to 
 
13 See for instance Jaroslav Pelikan, The Idea of the 
University: A Reexamination, New Haven, Yale University 
Press, 1992. 
14 Readings, The University in Ruins, p.4f. 
15 Ibid., p.130. 
market forces and getting rid of areas of learning 
and research that people are unwilling to pay for, 
universities are being made more productive. It is 
not the University but literature, a highly 
subsidized form of entertainment, which is in 
ruins. What matters is not literature but 
knowledge which enables us to produce more and 
greater variety of commodities. In the new 
globalized economy where knowledge is valued 
more than ever, universities are flourishing as 
transnational enterprises.  
To counter such an argument, more needs to be 
made of the sciences and other humanities 
disciplines, particularly history. An excursion 
into the history of science would have shown that 
science has been the battleground for different 
conceptions of the world, and even in 
Anglophone countries, has been as important for 
defining who we are as literature.16 Furthermore, 
historical research has shown that when the quest 
by scientists to comprehend the cosmos and our 
place within it is discounted and efforts made to 
control science and reduce it to an instrument, 
these efforts have always failed. Joseph Ben-
David revealed a recurrent pattern where creative 
advances within science have been followed by 
periods of stagnation as governments have 
attempted to manage science to make it serve the 
government and the economy.17 The last time this 
happened was with the Stalinization of science in 
the Soviet Union after 1929.18 In each case the 
proponents of these policies argued that it was 
impossible to leave science to the curiosity of 
philosophers or scientists; a new era had come 
making it impossible to go back to the past. In 
each case, science languished in what had been 
centres of creativity. Von Humboldt had 
recognized this destructive effect of efforts to 
manage research and his model of the university 
was designed to guarantee its autonomy from 
such interference. It can be expected, and now 
there is ample evidence, that the new round of 
managerial control of science integrating more 
 
16 The role of Darwinian evolutionary theory in this regard 
has been demonstrated by Robert M. Young in Darwin’s 
Metaphor, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985. 
17 Joseph Ben-David, The Scientist’s Role in Society: A 
Comparative Study, Englewood Cliffs, Prentice-Hall, 1971. 
18 On this, see Cultural Revolution in Russia, 1928-1931, ed. 
Sheila Fitzpatrick, Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 
1984. On its effect on biology, and ecology in particular, see 
Douglas R. Weiner, Models of Nature: Ecology, 
Conservation, and Cultural Revolution in Russia, 
Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 1988. 
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efficiently the University into the economy will 
have and is having the same destructive effects 
on science.19 On these grounds alone Readings 
was justified in characterizing the University as 
in ruins. 
However, it is in his willingness to abandon the 
‘nostalgia for national culture’20 and along with 
it, the nation-State and the historical project of 
Enlightenment that Readings most fully reveals 
his lack of appreciation of von Humboldt’s idea 
of the university. ‘National culture’ was so 
readily abandoned by Readings because he took 
this to be founded on the idea of community 
based on perfect communication with ‘mutual 
transparency’ associated with an idea of the State 
as ‘the abstract ground that assumes the 
individual is disinterested and autonomous.’ On 
this basis Readings argued that ‘the alleged 
autonomy of the subject, its freedom to 
participate in communicational transactions such 
as this, is conditional upon its subjection to the 
idea of the State. The subject is “free” only 
insofar as she or he becomes, for her- or himself, 
primarily subject to the state.’21 To this Readings 
counter-posed the ‘thought of community without 
identity’ in which ‘communication is not 
transparent, a community in which the possibility 
of communication is not grounded upon and 
reinforced by a common cultural identity.’22 Here 
‘the social bond is not the property of an 
autonomous subject, since it exceeds subjective 
consciousness and even individual histories of 
action.’23 Readings argued that we can dwell in 
the ruins of the university without a grand 
narrative of culture by giving up the thought of 
consensus and acknowledging that ‘”thinking 
together” is a dissensual process’.24 Such a 
postmodern analysis and proposal is to be 
expected from someone strongly influenced by 
 
19 J.R. Ravetz noted this in ‘Social Problems of 
Industrialized Science’ in Scientific Knowledge and its 
Social Problems, Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1973, ch.2. 
David Dickson showed how this corruption of science was 
gathering pace in the 1980s. See David Dickson, The New 
Politics of Science, Chicago: The University of Chicago 
Press, 1988. See esp. ch.2, ‘Universities and Industry: 
Knowledge as a Commodity’. 
20 Readings, The University in Ruins, p.149. 
21 Ibid., p.181f. 
22 Ibid., p.185. 
23 Ibid., p.186. 
24 Ibid., p.192. 
thinkers such as Lyotard,25 Derrida and Foucault 
with their concern to oppose what they took to be 
the oppressive tendencies deriving from German 
Idealism, particularly from Hegel. But this does 
not do justice to von Humboldt, or to Hegel.  
In choosing his principles for the University of 
Berlin, von Humboldt was influenced more by 
Schleiermacher than anyone else, and both von 
Humboldt and Schleiermacher were strongly 
influenced by Herder, whose ideas also 
influenced Hegel. There were few people more 
aware of the problems associated with 
communication and more tolerant of diversity 
and dissension than Herder. Herder originated the 
idea that it is only by tolerating diversity of 
points of view that we can ever hope to arrive at 
anything like the truth.26 He transcended the 
opposition between the dissensus and consensus 
that has preoccupied the postmodernists. This 
argument for tolerance of diversity strongly 
influenced von Humboldt. Von Humboldt was 
concerned to promote education which would 
develop people’s civic virtue and intellectual and 
physical excellence, but argued for two more 
elements: ‘moral autonomy, or the ability to 
govern ourselves, and individuality…, the 
development of each person’s unique 
character.’27 So insofar as the Humboldtian 
University was concerned to produce subjects for 
the State, they certainly were not the kind of 
subjects that Readings suggested they were. In 
fact, Herder was a major proponent of 
democracy, and while von Humboldt was a 
liberal rather than a democrat, the ‘subjects’ that 
Humboldt had in mind were the autonomous 
individuals required to support a State with a 
significant democratic component.  
 
LINKING EDUCATION AND DEMOCRACY 
 
25 Bill Readings wrote a book on Lyotard: Introducing 
Lyotard: Art and Politics, London, Routledge, 1991. 
26 See Johann Gottfried von Herder, ‘Letters for the 
Advancement of Humanity (1793-7) [excerpts concerning 
freedom of thought and expression], Philosophical Writings, 
trans. and ed. Michael N. Forster, Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press, 2002, pp.370-373. 
27 Frederick C. Beiser, ‘The Early Political Theory of 
Wilhelm von Humboldt’, Enlightenment, Revolution, and 
Romanticism: The Genesis of Modern German Political 
Thought, 1790-1800, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 
1992, p.132. 
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But there is no reference to democracy in 
Readings’ account of the university or in his 
proposed response to its present malaise. 
Readings exemplifies an anomaly, noted by 
Henry and Susan Giroux in their recent book, 
Take Back Higher Education: 
[N]either the decline of democracy nor the crisis 
of education have gone unnoticed. But curiously, 
progressive advocates and activists clustered 
around either issue have little regard for each 
other. Astute readers of the national political 
scene have little interest in … the state of 
education … And educators seem to have lost the 
language for linking schooling and democracy, 
convinced that education is now about job 
training and competitive market advantage.28 
The Girouxs argued that ‘[r]ecognizing the 
inextricable link between education and politics 
is central to reclaiming higher education as a 
democratic public sphere.’29 They made the 
obvious point that in a democracy ‘formal sites of 
pedagogy must provide citizens with the kinds of 
critical capacities, modes of literacies, 
knowledge, and skills that enable them to both 
read the world critically and participate in 
shaping and governing it.’30 They also pointed 
out the relation between the destruction of higher 
education, globalization and neo-liberalism. 
‘Globalization now signals the retreat of nation-
States that once played a significant role in 
ameliorating the most brutal features of 
capitalism’.31 Concomitantly, ‘[t]he ascendancy 
of neoliberalism and corporate culture … not 
only consolidates economic power in the hands 
of the few; it also aggressively attempts to … 
subordinate the needs of society to the market, 
reduce civic education to job training, and render 
public services and amenities an unconscionable 
luxury.’32 As a consequence, ‘a democracy of 
critical citizens is being replaced quickly by an 
ersatz democracy of consumers.’33 They point out 
that ‘[i]f right-wing reforms in higher education 
continue unchallenged, the consequences will 
 
28 Henry A. Giroux and Susan Searls Giroux, Take Back 
Higher Education: Race, Youth, and the Crisis of 
Democracy in the Post-Civil Rights Era, New York, 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2004, p.4. 
29 Ibid., p.8. 
30 Ibid., p.7. 
31 Ibid., p.75. 
32 Ibid., p.249. 
33 Ibid., p.222. 
result in a highly undemocratic, bifurcated civic 
body.’34 
But even the Girouxs have not fully faced up to 
the role required of universities to support 
democracy. To defend this argument they did not 
refer to the Humboldtian University. They 
invoked ‘a distinguished tradition of educational 
thought … extending from Thomas Jefferson and 
W.E.B. Du Bois to Jane Addams, John Dewey, 
and C. Wright Mills’, thinkers who argued that 
‘citizens have to be educated for the task of self-
government.’35 They also invoked Raymond 
Williams and Cornelius Castoriadis. However, 
the idea of citizens being educated to be able to 
govern themselves is not taken as taken 
sufficiently seriously. This is illustrated by the 
Girouxs’ defence of multiculturalism, not only 
against neo-liberals and neo-conservatives, but 
also against ‘conservatives’ such as Harold 
Bloom and E.D. Hirsch. Hirsch is criticized 
because his notion of ‘citizen as bearer of 
common cultural knowledge … privileges a 
Eurocentric perspective of history and culture’.36 
One can hardly object to the Girouxs’ complaint 
against conservative defenders of the study of 
literature that they had shifted ‘from production 
of active citizens to passive consumers of high 
culture.’37 But the Girouxs have a less profound 
appreciation than Readings of the original role of 
literature in the curriculum. In opposing the 
notion of common cultural knowledge and 
defending multiculturalism, they are really 
focused on how to defend and extend the public 
sphere as a place for oppositional discourse based 
on ‘democratic imperatives of equality, liberty, 
and justice’ rather than for people upholding 
these imperatives to take power and really govern 
themselves. Readings had a more profound 
understanding of multiculturalism within cultural 
studies - as an ineffectual effort to adapt to 
economic globalization in which the University 
has become a transnational corporation.38 Or 
worse, as Masao Miyoshi suggested, it is an alibi 
for complicity in the trans-national corporation 
 
34 Ibid., p.11.                                                                                                            
35 Ibid., p.223. 
36 Ibid., p.163f. 
37 Ibid., p.167. 
38 Readings, The University in Ruins, p.45. 
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version of neocolonialism.39 Hirsch is really more 
radical in this regard.40  
The problem with the Girouxs’ approach can be 
highlighted by looking more closely at the work 
of Castoriadis with whom they align themselves. 
In The Terror of Neoliberalism, Henry Giroux 
quotes with approval Castoriadis’s claim that 
education is required to sustain democracy: 
Let us suppose that a democracy, as complete, 
perfect, etc., as one might wish, might fall upon 
us from the heavens: this sort of democracy will 
not be able to endure for more than a few years if 
it does not engender individuals that correspond 
to it, ones that, first and foremost, are capable of 
making it function and reproducing it. There can 
be no democratic society without democratic 
paedia.41  
This is surely true, and it is laudable that Giroux 
turns for support to one of the most profound 
proponents of democracy of the twentieth 
century. But Castoriadis also argued that 
democracy is very rare. Democracy, for 
Castoriadis, meant that society is autonomous, 
that is, at least in part, ‘it self-institutes explicitly 
and reflectively.’42 Autonomy in this sense has 
only been achieved twice in history, Castoriadis 
claimed, the first time in the democratic Ancient 
Greek cities, the second time with far greater 
breadth in the modern Western world, which he 
took to have begun in the late Middle Ages and 
to be fading out in the present.43 Education for 
democracy must be of a very unusual kind. 
Individuals  become autonomous by explicitly 
coming to want to be something, an Athenian, a 
Florentine or whatever, explicitly and reflectively 
choosing to participate in the social imaginary 
significations of their society – norms, values, 
myths, representations, projects, traditions, etc., 
which involves ‘an effort to make be and to give 
 
39 Miyoshi, ‘A Borderless World? From Colonialism to 
Transnationalism and the Decline of the Nation-State’, 
p.751. 
40 See E.D. Hirsch, Jr. ‘Why Traditional Education is more 
Progressive’, The American Enterprise, March/April, 1997, 
pp.42-45. 
41 Henry A. Giroux, The Terror of Neoliberalism: 
Authoritarianism and the Eclipse of Democracy, Boulder, 
Paradigm Publications, 2004. This quote is from Cornelius 
Castoriadis, ‘Democracy as Procedure and Democracy as 
Regime,’ Constellations vol.4, no.1, 1997, p.10. 
42 Cornelius Castoriadis, ‘Culture in a Democratic Society’ 
in The Castoriadis Reader, trans. and ed. David Ames 
Curtis, Oxford, Blackwell, 1997, p.340. 
43 Ibid., p.340. 
life to the institution of its society.’44 This 
supports the Girouxs’ claim that students should 
be educated to be active; but far more is required; 
and it is hardly compatible with multiculturalism. 
It appears that democracy has been so corroded 
that even its most ardent defenders are losing a 
sense of what it involves. 
 
LINKING DEMOCRACY WITH THE HUMBOLDTIAN 
UNIVERSITY 
So what form of education is required for 
democracy in the modern world? The problem, 
first of all, is to define what we mean by 
democracy. Almost everyone apart from Islamic 
fundamentalists claim to be on the side of 
democracy; but the word has lost almost all 
meaning. Neo-liberals and neo-conservatives 
have been able to portray themselves as on the 
side of democracy simply by redefining it as the 
freedom to exchange labour, resources, goods 
and services in a global market dominated by 
transnational corporations and billionaires. We 
live in a culture where, as Ulrich Beck aptly put 
it: ‘Concepts are empty: they no longer grip, 
illuminate or inflame. The greyness lying over 
the world […] may also come from a kind of 
verbal mildew.’45 To free ourselves from this 
verbal mildew and to recover the original 
meaning of democracy it is necessary to revive a 
moribund language. Castoriadis attempted to do 
this, attempting to recover the original meaning 
of democracy as part of the project of autonomy. 
He was surely right in believing that if we want 
to understand democracy in a world in which the 
project of democracy is in crisis, especially in an 
Orwellian post-1984 world where language has 
been distorted and the meaning of words 
inverted, then we do need to go back to the first 
instance of democracy to work out what it really 
meant. Having done this, however, Castoriadis 
provided little comfort for those attempting to 
defend or redefine modern institutions to align 
them with democracy, and certainly was no 
supporter of the Humboldtian University. His 
work was opposed not only to capitalism, but 
also to socialism and communism which, he 
argued, through their over-riding concern with 
 
44 Cornelius Castoriadis, ‘The Crisis of Western Societies’ in 
The Castoriadis Reader, p.261. 
45 Ulrich Beck, What is Globalization? trans. Patrick 
Camiller, Cambridge, Polity Press, 2000, p.8. 
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control and economic growth had abandoned or 
undermined the project of autonomy.46 A former 
Marxist and at one stage an associate of Lyotard, 
Castoriadis became highly critical of the heritage 
of German thought.47 In fact Castoriadis’s 
criticisms of German philosophy and Hegel in 
particular as ‘the full opposition to modernity 
within modernity – or the full opposition, more 
generally, to the Greco-Western spirit’,48 lends 
support to Readings’ misgivings about the 
Humboldtian University for promoting a very 
limited and compromised form of democracy, 
one that involved reducing people to subjects of 
the State. Castoriadis portrayed education in the 
modern world as nothing but ‘a breadwinning 
chore for educators, a boring burden for pupils … 
it has become a question of obtaining a piece of 
paper (a diploma) that will allow one to exercise 
a profession (if one finds work).’49 
Castoriadis’s criticisms of the institutions of 
modernity would suggest that he believed we 
should revive the social forms of Ancient Greece. 
But Castoriadis argued that ‘Athenian democracy 
cannot be for us anything but a germ, and in no 
way a model; one would have to be a fool to 
claim that the political organization of 30,000 
citizens might be copied so as to organize 35 or 
150 million citizens.’50 So while Castoriadis 
deployed his insights into the nature of autonomy 
as this had begun to be realized in Ancient 
Greece to criticize core institutions and ideas of 
the modern world, particularly to expose the 
pseudo-democracy of the new neo-liberal order,51 
he was very vague about what kind of society we 
should be striving for.52 But then Castoriadis was 
very vague about the second emergence of 
autonomy that occurred in the modern world. I 
think it can be shown that, partly for this reason, 
he did not do justice to the German thought of 
 
46 Cornelius Castoriadis, ‘The Pulverization of Marxism-
Leninism’, World in Fragments, trans. and ed. David Ames 
Curtis, Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1997, pp.58-69. 
47 Cornelius Castoriadis, ‘The Retreat from Autonomy’, 
World in Fragments, pp.32-43. 
48 Ibid., p.35. 
49 Cornelius Castoriadis, ‘The Crisis of Western Societies’ in 
The Castoriadis Reader, p.260. 
50 Cornelius Castoriadis, ‘Done and To be Done’, in The 
Castoriadis Reader, p.407. 
51 Castoriadis, ‘The Pulverization of Marxism-Leninism’, in 
World in Fragments , esp. p.68f. 
52 See Castoriadis, ‘Done and To be Done’, in The 
Castoriadis Reader, p.413ff. 
which he became so critical. While this could be 
shown by examining Castoriadis’ explicit 
comments on different German philosophers and 
contesting his interpretations, it is much more 
illuminating to see these German philosophers as 
inheritors of the tradition of the Greek quest for 
autonomy as this was described by Castoriadis, 
developing this tradition to deal with new 
circumstances. In this way, the historical 
continuity in the quest for democracy and 
education can be shown and the importance of 
the Humboldtian University as a core institution 
of democracy revealed. The Girouxs’ argument 
for combining the defence of education with the 
defence of democracy can then be strengthened.  
To argue this it is necessary to combat the 
politically debilitating orthodox Marxist view 
(which Marx himself abandoned)53 that history 
can be understood as a mere sequence of socio-
economic formations, denying any significant 
role to the ongoing struggle for liberty against 
forms of domination. Modernity did not 
inaugurate an era of capitalism in which all 
political institutions were merely instruments in 
the struggle to accumulate capital. Democratic 
institutions of the modern nation-State developed 
in the struggle for freedom at least partly in 
opposition to those who were deploying market 
mechanisms to exploit people. The neoliberals 
and neoconservatives, who are imposing a 
globalized market by fraud or force are not 
proponents of democracy, as they claim. They are 
reviving a profoundly anti-democratic tradition of 
thought inspired by Hobbes, using the market to 
subvert democracy and dominate people. The 
tradition of democracy derives from an opposing 
tradition, that of the ‘radical enlightenment’.54 
One of the most important components of this 
radical enlightenment is education, particularly as 
it was developed and promoted by the 
Humboldtian University. The advance of the 
Humboldtian University was a triumph in the 
struggle for democracy. This is the form of the 
University that has kept alive the quest for 
autonomy. I will argue that the struggle ahead, 
 
53 On this, see James D. White, Karl Marx and the 
Intellectual Origins of Dialectical Materialism, Macmillan 
Press, 1996, esp. p.275. 
54 The term ‘radical enlightenment’ was coined in 1981 by 
Margaret C. Jacob in The Radical Enlightenment: 
Pantheists, Freemasons and Republicans (2nd ed. The 
Temple Publishers, 2003) to characterize the radical legacy 
of the English Revolution. 
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which will determine the future of the world, will 
be a struggle between corporate globalization 
defended by neoliberals and neoconservatives, 
and democracy, and the defence of the 
Humboldtian University is central to this struggle 
for democracy. 
 
DEMOCRACY AND THE ANCIENT GREEKS 
What was democracy for the Ancient Greeks? As 
Castoriadis pointed out, ‘democracy’ meant a 
polis in which citizens were actively participating 
in legislating and decision-making, with offices 
filled by lot. Essentially, the Greeks invented 
politics. In Athens, citizens were required to 
consider public issues, express their views and 
discuss these in the agora before voting in the 
ecclesia. As Pericles proclaimed in his Funeral 
Oration at the outset of the Peloponnesian War: 
‘Here each individual is interested not only in his 
own affairs but in the affairs of the polis as well 
… we do not say that a man who takes no interest 
in politics is a man who minds his own business; 
we say that he has no business here at all.’55 
There was no ‘representation’. Castoriadis argued 
that it was here, for the first time, that a people no 
longer took their institutions as having a 
foundation outside the community, as 
heteronymous, and saw themselves as 
autonomous. A society is autonomous, 
Castoriadis argued, ‘not only if it knows that it 
makes its laws but also if it is up to the task of 
putting them into question.’56 With the birth of 
autonomy, unlimited interrogation of actions, 
institutions and beliefs exploded on the scene.57 
Castoriadis argued that it was this autonomy, 
involving the population in decision-making, 
which led to the birth and flourishing of 
philosophy, drama and history as the citizens of 
Athens grappled with the problems raised by this 
freedom of how to make decisions, how to 
evaluate actions, how to live and how to organize 
society. As he put it: 
 
55 Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War, trans. Rex 
Warner, Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1972, Bk II, 40, p.147 
(translation modified). 
56 Castoriadis, ‘The Greek and the Modern Political 
Imaginary’, World in Fragments, p.87. 
57 For an analysis of this see Cornelius Castoriadis, ‘Power, 
Politics, Autonomy’ in Philosophy, Politics, Autonomy: 
Essays in Political Philosophy. New York, Oxford 
University Press, 1991, pp.143-174. 
[A]utonomy, social as well as individual, is a 
project. … The questions raised are, on the social 
level: Are our laws good? Are they just? Which 
laws ought we to make? And, on the individual 
level: Is what I think true? Can I know if it is 
true—and if so, how? … Autonomy … is the 
unlimited self-questioning about the law and its 
foundations as well as the capacity, in light of 
this interrogation, to make, to do and to 
institute.58 
Some of the most important questions to emerge 
in this environment were What is the good life? 
and How can society be organized to enable 
people to live the good life? This was associated 
with the development of the notion of the 
common good both as a goal defining the 
political order and as a topic for investigation. All 
decision-making was expected to be for the 
common good. Aristotle characterized proper 
constitutions as monarchies, aristocracies or 
democracies according to whether one person, 
the best people, or the general population rule for 
the common good. Tyrannies, oligarchies and 
ochlocracies, where people rule in their own 
interests, were seen as deviations from proper 
constitutions.59  
With democracy the education of citizens became 
a major concern, required to enable them and to 
motivate them to participate in and defend these 
institutions.60 As Castoriadis pointed out, 
education involved ‘becoming conscious that the 
polis is also oneself and that its fate also depends 
upon one’s mind, behaviour, and decisions; in 
other words, it is participation in political life.’61 
‘No one would dispute the fact that it is a 
lawgiver’s prime duty to arrange for the 
education of the young’ Aristotle argued in The 
Politics. The ultimate concern of education was 
the character of the people. ‘[In] all 
 
58 Castoriadis, ‘Power, Politics, Autonomy’ in Philosophy, 
Politics, Autonomy, p.163f. 
59 Aristotle, The Politics, Bk III – 7, trans. T.A. Sinclair, 
Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1981, p.189f. There is a problem 
in translating Aristotle in that he used the term ‘demokratia’ 
to characterize the degenerate form of ‘politeia’. Given the 
subsequent history of the terms I think it is appropriate to 
translate ‘politeia’ as ‘democracy’ and demokratia’ as 
‘ochlocracy’. See the translator’s comments on p.191n. 
60 On this see Castoriadis, ‘The Greek Polis and the Creation 
of Democracy’ in Philosophy, Politics, Autonomy, p.101f. 
and M.I. Finley, Politics in the Ancient World, Cambridge, 
C.U.P., 1983. 
61 Castoriadis, ‘The Greek Polis and the Creation of 
Democracy’ in Philosophy, Politics, Autonomy, p.113.  
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circumstances the best character produces the 
best constitution’ Aristotle proclaimed. While 
there must be preparatory training for various 
crafts and professions, there must also be training 
in virtue. And ‘since there is but one aim for the 
entire city, it follows that education must be one 
and the same for all and that the oversight of 
education must be a public concern…’62 What 
kind of character is required for a democracy? A 
character aware of the value of freedom and with 
the courage to fight for it.  
While Castoriadis made some profound 
observations about the Ancient Greeks, even he 
did not do full justice to what they stood for. The 
Greeks were under constant threat from Persia. 
Ancient Persia was a multinational empire, the 
ancient equivalent of the globalized economy of 
today. If the Greeks had not defended 
themselves, they would have been incorporated 
into this commercially prosperous empire in 
which they might well have flourished 
economically, but at the loss of their autonomy. It 
is because they valued autonomy rather than 
economic prosperity and had the courage to fight 
for it that the foundations of European 
civilization were laid. Pericles called upon his 
fellow Athenians to ‘Make up your minds that 
happiness depends on being free, and freedom 
depends upon being courageous.’63 Although the 
Athenians were defeated first by the Spartans, 
and then later by the Macedonians, Pericles’ 
prediction that ‘Future ages will wonder at us, as 
the present age wonders at us now’64 proved 
correct. They inspired a struggle by people for 
autonomy which has continued, with 
interruptions, to the present.  
 
DEMOCRACY AFTER THE ANCIENT GREEKS 
As I have noted, Castoriadis acknowledged that 
the modernity of the West inaugurated a new era 
of autonomy, but was very vague about how this 
began and how it developed. He took this to have 
begun at the end of the Middle Ages, identifying 
it with the ‘new cities founded by a new category 
 
62 Aristotle, The Politics, Bk VIII, I, trans. T.A. Sinclair, 
Harmondsworth, Penguin, p.299. 
63 Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War, Bk II, 43, 
p.149f. 
64 Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War , Bk II, 41, 
p.148. 
of individuals, the first “bourgeois”’.65 
Castoriadis did not pay much attention to this 
development. In fact, the revival of autonomy 
took place in Northern Italy beginning in the 
Eleventh Century, and engendered the new 
philosophy of civic humanism. The Italians as 
they struggled to maintain their autonomy looked 
back to the Ancient World for guidance, not only 
to Ancient Greece, but also to the Republic of 
Ancient Rome. Although the Romans never 
achieved autonomy of the Ancient Greeks, it is 
necessary to recognize that the era of the Roman 
Republic also contributed something to the idea 
of democracy, bequeathing to posterity the notion 
of the republic, the model of a mixed constitution 
and the idea of liberty.  
The Romans overthrew their kings and 
proclaimed Rome a ‘republic’; that is, a res 
publica, a ‘public thing’. As Polybius (a Greek) 
noted, this republic had a ‘mixed constitution’, 
part monarchy, part aristocracy and part 
democracy. While being more aristocratic than 
democratic, this constitution proved more stable 
than the democracy of Athens and was therefore 
characterized by Polybius as ‘the best of all 
existing constitutions.’66 For the most part, 
subsequent defences of democracy have been 
defences of mixed constitutions with a strong 
democratic component. It was the development 
of the concept of liberty, however, which was 
most important contribution of the Romans to the 
subsequent history of democracy.  
The Roman Republic succumbed not to external 
forces, but to corruption from within. This was 
associated with the concentration of wealth and 
the growth of empire, the corrosive effects of 
which culminated in the seizure of power by 
Julius Caesar. It was in winning and then losing 
their autonomy that the Romans developed their 
own concept of freedom – ‘liberty’. Unlike later 
social contract theorists, liberty was not seen as 
natural state of individuals to which we have a 
right, but as something won and maintained. For 
individuals to be free requires first and foremost 
that they be members of an autonomous or self-
governing State or community. To be self-
governing, the laws of the State must be enacted 
 
65 Cornelius Castoriadis, ‘The Crisis of Culture and the 
State’, Philosophy, Politics, Autonomy, p.221. 
66 Polybius, The Rise of the Roman Empire, Bk VI-10ff., 
trans. Ian Scott-Kilvert, Harmondsworth, Penguin Books, 
1979, p.311ff. 
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with the consent of all its citizens who must all 
be subject to these laws. Livy (who wrote a 142 
volume history of Rome) characterized Rome as 
a self-governing community in which ‘the 
imperium of the laws is greater than that of any 
other men’.67  
Such liberty was always defined in opposition to 
a condition of slavery. When Livy speaks of free 
States losing their liberty, he invariably refers to 
this as falling into slavery. A slave is someone 
subject to the jurisdiction of someone else and is 
consequently in the power of another person.68 
Whether or not they are coerced is not the issue. 
A slave who ingratiates himself to his master and 
thereby avoids coercion is still a slave. Romans 
jurists characterized the condition of someone 
perpetually subject or liable to harm in this way 
as obnoxious, while Roman moralists and 
historians applied this term to anyone dependent 
on the will, or goodwill, of someone else. And 
this is how many Romans understood their 
condition after the Republic had been 
overthrown. 
The success with which tyrants and oligarchs had 
crushed the quest for liberty and the democratic 
spirit is evident in the amazement of the twelfth 
century German historian, Otto of Freising, that 
in Northern Italy people’s desire for liberty had 
generated a political life in cities at odds with the 
assumption that the only sound form of 
government is an hereditary monarchy. These 
people had formed independent republics 
governed by consuls who were changed almost 
every year in order to maintain the freedom of the 
people.69 Frederick Barbarossa, the German 
emperor, invaded in 1154. The Italian city-States 
successfully fought off repeated invasions from 
the German emperors over nearly two centuries. 
Initially, the Papacy had supported the city-
States, but then it attempted to control them, 
often by manipulating their internal politics. This 
also was effectively resisted. However, most of 
the republics later succumbed to internal discord 
and the seizure of power by despots. In the effort 
to defend their liberty and to understand and 
 
67 Cited by Quentin Skinner, Liberty Before Liberalism, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998, p.45 from 
Livy 2. 1. 1. 
68 See ibid., p.41. 
69 Quentin Skinner, The Foundations of Modern Political 
Thought, Volume One, The Renaissance, Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press, 1978, p.3. 
avoid the corruption which led to despotism, a 
number of thinkers in Florence, one of the last 
republics to succumb to despotism, rediscovered 
and advanced the heritage of Greek and Roman 
political thought. This was the tradition of ‘civic 
humanism’.70  
Looking back to the rise and fall of Athens and of 
republican Rome as well as to their own history, 
the Florentines identified liberty with both 
freedom from external aggression and from 
tyranny, and as active citizenship in pursuit of the 
common good. What was new about civic 
humanism was its focus on how to avoid the 
corruption which undermined liberty and thereby 
led to people’s enslavement either to conquerors 
or to despots. Corruption could be lack of civic 
commitment by the people, putting their own 
interests before the interests of the city, or it 
could be the pursuit of glory by the nobles. To 
avoid corruption, it was argued, it is necessary to 
provide people with the opportunity of achieving 
honour by working for the public good, involving 
them as much as possible in the running of the 
commonwealth, and to cultivate virtù, the 
individual’s capacity for political and military 
action. Virtù, a notion which is Roman or 
‘Ciceronian’ rather than Athenian, was 
understood to be both intensely public and 
intensely personal. As appropriated by the civic 
humanists, it served to identify ‘the citizen’s 
personal autonomy with his immediate capacity 
for public action; without the one, he would not 
have the other.’71 This required the right process 
of education, which became a major concern of 
the civic humanists in their quest prevent the 
decay of republics.  It was argued, originally by 
Petrarch, that a scholastic education should be 
replaced by an education based on the study of 
the classics, and that the study of Greek 
philosophers should be supplemented by the 
study of Roman rhetorical writings. Petrarch 
argued that while Aristotle’s analysis might 
contain penetrating insights, ‘his lesson lacks the 
words that sting and set afire’ and so he is unable 
to urge his readers ‘towards love of virtue and 
hatred of vice’.72 The Roman rhetorical writings 
 
70 This was argued by Hans Baron in The Crisis of the Early 
Italian Renaissance, revised ed. New Jersey, Princeton 
University Press, 1966, p.47ff. 
71 J.G.A. Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment: Florentine 
Political Thought and the Atlantic Republican Tradition, 
Princeton, Princeton University Press, 2003, p.558. 
72 Skinner, Liberty Before Liberalism, p.88. 
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provided this. At the same time, the Florentines 
revived the study of history which also became a 
central component of Renaissance education.73 
  
EXTENDING THE STRUGGLE FOR DEMOCRACY TO 
COUNTRIES 
While the Italian city-States sometimes formed 
alliances, government was, as it had been in the 
Ancient world, of cities. Republican Rome was a 
city with an empire, not a country. With the 
Treaty of Westphalia (or ‘Peace of Westphalia’) 
of 1648, which put an end to the Thirty Years 
War, a new political structure came into 
existence. The Treaty, which put an end to the 
religious wars which had decimated Europe, 
broke the power of the Holy Roman Empire, 
gave formal recognition to the United Provinces 
(the Netherlands) and the Swiss Confederation, 
and created the State as simultaneously the 
political organization of a country and a 
component of a System of States recognizing 
each other’s legitimacy and autonomy. From the 
seventeenth century onwards, the ideas of the 
civic humanists and other Italian thinkers helped 
inspire struggles to transform these States into 
democratic republics. The quest to create a 
republic in Britain, the reaction to this by 
Hobbes, the intellectual struggle between the 
proponents and opponents of democracy and the 
defeat of the more democratic among the 
revolutionaries inspired directly or indirectly 
most of modern political philosophy.  
To begin with, the English civic humanists 
elaborated the ideas and ideals of the Italian civic 
humanists, while the ‘nature enthusiasts’ 
developed a more radically egalitarian 
philosophy. While the Italians had characterized 
the state of dependency as obnoxious, the English 
civic humanists condemned the ‘obnoxious 
character’ of people formed by such an 
obnoxious relationship. The upright person full of 
integrity required to sustain a free society was 
contrasted with ‘the obnoxious lackeys and 
parasites who flourish at court’ characterized as 
‘lewd, dissolute and debauched … cringing, 
servile and base … fawning, abject and lacking in 
manliness.’74 Such notions had a major influence 
 
73 See Christopher Hill, The Intellectual Origins of the 
English Revolution Revisited, Oxford: Clarendon, 2001, 
p.156f. 
74 Skinner, Liberty Before Liberalism, 1998, p.95f. 
on the first English revolution. Charles I was 
condemned and then executed in 1649 partly 
because by invading parliament he was, from the 
perspective of the civic humanists, striving to 
make people dependent upon his will. He was 
seen thereby as attempting to enslave to him the 
upright people of Britain.75 Confronting the 
magnitude of the task of preserving ancient 
liberties in the modern world after the revolution, 
a leading English civic humanist, James 
Harrington, proposed various measures to deal 
with the tendency to corruption. This included a 
division of powers between the legislative and 
executive arms of government, an idea first put 
forward by the Florentine civic humanist 
Francesco Guicciardini, a notion that came to be 
widely embraced without its source being 
appreciated.76  
Following the Italian civic humanists, the English 
republicans also argued for the central 
importance of education in avoiding corruption. 
John Milton, a more radical civic humanist than 
Harrington, argued that ‘[t]here can be no true 
political reformation which is not also a 
reformation of manners and morals, of the 
household, of education.’77 Another republican, 
Robert Molesworth, argued that pupils should be 
exposed to ‘the weightier matters of true learning 
… such as good principles, morals, the 
improvement of reason, the love of justice, the 
value of liberty, the duty one owes to one’s 
country and the laws … the right notion of a 
generous and legal freedom.’78 
The Levellers also called for a republic, calling 
for more democracy. They argued for political 
rights for all householders, however poor.79 The 
more radical Levellers, the True Levellers or 
Diggers, embraced a form of ‘nature enthusiasm’ 
which echoed the philosophy of Giordano Bruno 
who, along with defending a new religion of 
 
75 See ibid., p.47ff. Such sentiments were supplemented by a 
false belief in an ‘ancient constitution’ that was supposedly 
being subverted.  
76 See Pocock, The Machiavellan Moment, p.480. 
77 Blair Worden, ‘English republicanism’, The Cambridge 
History of Political Thought: 1450-1700, ed. J.H. Burns, 
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1991, p.456. 
78 Cited by Worden, ‘English Republicanism’, The 
Cambridge History of Political Thought, p.469. 
79 The Levellers were not influenced by civic humanism. 
See David Wootton, ‘Leveller democracy and the Puritan 
Revolution’, in The Cambridge History of Political 
Thought: 1450-1700, pp.412-442. 
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nature80 also defended republicanism.81 Nature 
enthusiasm and the work of Bruno involved an 
even more revolutionary transformation of 
thought, challenging the hierarchical cosmology 
of traditional Christianity and celebrating the 
creativity of nature. 
 
THE OLIGARCHIC REACTION TO CIVIC HUMANISM 
AND NATURE ENTHUSIASM 
Cromwell had no interest in the civic humanists’ 
notion of liberty and was utterly hostile to their 
more radical allies, the Levellers. After the 
revolution, he became effectively a dictator. With 
the restoration, which followed Cromwell’s 
death, an attempt was made to re-establish 
absolute power in the hands of the monarch. 
Although the king was overthrown in the 
Glorious Revolution of 1688, this was not a 
triumph of civic humanism and democracy. It 
involved a new configuration of power based on 
a new ideology. The struggle for liberty by those 
influenced by civic humanism had provoked a 
significant intellectual reaction, to begin with, 
from Thomas Hobbes. Hobbes attempted to 
undermine and replace the intellectual 
foundations of the civic humanists’ (and 
Aristotle’s) political philosophy and to transform 
language to make their ideas unthinkable.82 
Embracing and developing a mechanistic view of 
nature, he characterized humans as machines 
moved by appetites and aversions, society as a 
social contract between these egoistic 
individuals, and redefined liberty as not being 
hindered from acting according to one’s 
powers.83 Justice he redefined as simply that 
which is lawful, whatever the laws happen to be. 
Hobbes denied any connection between freedom 
and participation in the public life of an 
autonomous society. In society people are free, 
 
80 The revolutionary nature of this doctrine has been argued 
by Louis Dupré, Passage To Modernity: An Essay in the 
Hermeneutics of Nature and Culture, New Haven, Yale 
University Press, 1993, esp. p.58. 
81 See Christopher Hill, The World Turned Upside Down, 
Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1975, esp. chap.7. On the most 
influential True Leveller, Gerrard Winstanley,  see Brian 
Easlea, Witch Hunting, Magic & the New Philosophy, New 
Jersey, Humanities Press, 1980, pp.222-231. On Bruno, see 
Jacob, The Radical Enlightenment, esp. p.31f.  
82 Skinner, Liberty Before Liberalism,  p.10. 
83 See Thomas Hobbes, ‘Of the Liberty of Subjects’, 
Leviathan, [1651] Harmondsworth, Penguin Books, 1986, 
Part II, Chap.XXI, p.261ff. 
he argued, when through fear of the 
consequences of disobeying laws they acquire a 
will to obey the laws. Freedom therefore is 
compatible tyranny, the form of absolutist 
monarchy Hobbes was defending.  
The Latitudinarians, the moderate Whigs, were 
concerned to oppose absolutist monarchy, but 
continued Hobbes’ opposition to civic humanism, 
and also attacked the more radical ideas of the 
nature enthusiasts. Robert Boyle and Isaac 
Newton, the major intellectual figures in this 
movement, strove to develop an alternative 
philosophy of nature to that of the scholastics and 
most importantly, to that of the nature 
enthusiasts.84 John Locke, embracing Hobbes’ 
conception of humans as complex machines, 
allied himself with Newton and reformulated 
Hobbes’ social contract theory to represent the 
central role of government as the protection of 
property. Although he also sought to justify 
insurrection against tyrants under certain 
circumstances, rule by parliament and argued for 
religious tolerance, he was not a defender of 
democracy. He was a defender of oligarchy, rule 
by the few in their own interests. The Hobbesian 
conception of humans as complex machines was 
further elaborated by the utilitarians in their 
attempt to develop a ‘moral Newtonianism’.85 
Utilitarianism originated with John Gay 
(portraying himself as a disciple of Locke), who 
argued in a work published in 1730 that ‘all 
people seek pleasure and avoid pain: to seek 
pleasure is at once the necessary and the normal 
law of human action, and those actions are 
obligatory which lead to happiness.’86 This idea 
was developed by Helvetius, Paley and Bentham 
into a juridical theory, a political theory and a 
science of society and of social control. Closely 
related to the utilitarians were Scottish thinkers 
 
84 See Easlea, Witch Hunting, Magic & the New Philosophy, 
p.137. See also Carolyn Merchant, The Death of Nature, 
London, Wildwood House, 1982. On the Latitudinarians, see 
James R. Jacob, Robert Boyle and the English Revolution, 
New York,, Burt Franklin, 1977, and Margaret C. Jacob, The 
Newtonians and the English Revolution, 1689-1720, Ithaca, 
N.Y., Cornell University Press, 1976. On the outcome of the 
triumph of Newtonian thinking, see Margaret C. Jacob, The 
Cultural Meaning of the Scientific Revolution, New York, 
Alfred A. Knopf, 1988. 
85 Elie Halévy, The Growth of Philosophic Radicalism, 
trans. Mary Morris, London, Faber and Faber, 1978, p.6. 
86 Ibid., p.7. 
 DEMOCRACY AND EDUCATION  
Concrescence 2005 Vol.6 pp. 3-27 ISSN 1445-4297 © Arran Gare, 2005. 
 
15
such as David Hume and Adam Smith.87 The 
Scots, taking the opposite path to the Ancient 
Greeks, had given up its claim to sovereignty in 
1707 and had subsequently flourished as a centre 
of commerce. This led to a relative decline of 
interest in politics and, despite the strong 
influence of civic humanism and its defence by 
Adam Ferguson, a vigorous effort to develop a 
science of society modelled on Newtonian 
physics.88 Postulating avarice and a desire for 
gain as a constant principle of human nature, 
Smith laid the foundations for classical 
economics as the science best equipped to 
explain the dynamics of societies. ‘The invisible 
hand’ could now replace the quest for autonomy 
and control over one’s destiny. Bentham 
attempted to fuse his own ideas with those of 
Smith. The success of these thinkers realized 
Hobbes’ goal, to render the notion of liberty, and 
with it, the notion of democracy, as these had 
been understood by the civic humanists, 
unthinkable. As Castoriadis put it, this is where 
the ‘emancipatory project of autonomy’ was 
replaced with the ‘imaginary of technical and 
organizational rationality’.89 This helped to 
transform British government, despite the power 
of the House of Commons (elected with a very 
limited franchise) into an oligarchy based on 
wealth which deprived most people of access to 
means of production, forcing them to sell their 
labour power as a commodity; that is, reducing 
them to ‘wage slaves’ dependent on the wills of 
others for their livelihood. As these people were 
impoverished, government became increasingly 
oppressive. This is the tradition which the neo-
liberals have revived.90 
 
 
87 Ibid., ch.3. It has since been shown that Adam Smith’s 
views are more complex than Halévy  appreciated and did 
not totally reject civic humanism (see Donald Winch, Adam 
Smith’s Politics: An essay in historiographic revision, 
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1975), but this 
does not invalidate the overall picture of this tradition of 
thought. 
88 See Fania Ox-Salzberger, ‘The political theory of the 
Scottish Enlightenment’ and Andrew S. Skinner, ‘Economic 
Theory’ in The Cambridge Companion to the Scottish 
Enlightenment, Alexander Broadie (ed.), Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press. 2003. 
89 Castoriadis, ‘The Pulverisation of Marxism-Leninism,’ 
World in Fragments, p.62. 
90 This tradition is analysed in Arran Gare, Nihilism Inc., 
Sydney, Eco-Logical Press, 1996, chaps 5-7. 
THE RADICAL ENLIGHTENMENT AND THE REVIVAL 
OF CIVIC HUMANISM 
The ideas of the civic humanists and the nature 
enthusiasts did not completely disappear, 
however. In Europe these traditions were fused 
by John Toland and others to form what Margaret 
Jacob called the ‘radical enlightenment’.91 
Toland, strongly influenced by Bruno, coined the 
term ‘pantheism’ to characterize their 
cosmological views. A similar synthesis of 
thought had been emerging earlier in the 
Netherlands associated with Pieter Plockhoy, 
Van den Enden and the brothers Koerbagh, 
although in less coherent form.92 This was the 
original enlightenment, with its roots in the 
Renaissance. The Cartesians, Newtonians and 
Leibnizians were reacting against these radical 
ideas, and they developed what Jonathon Israel 
has characterized as the ‘moderate 
enlightenment’. This was, Israel noted, supported 
‘by numerous governments and influential 
factions in the main Churches’.93 With the 
triumph of the moderate enlightenment in the 
early decades of the eighteenth century, 
specifically, the Newtonian/Lockean branch of 
this, the radical enlightenment went underground 
where it flourished internationally, its ideas being 
disseminated through the Masonic lodges, 
 
91 On the formation of the radical enlightenment, see Jacob, 
The Radical Enlightenment, esp. p.63f.  
92 On these thinkers and their influence see Jonathan I. 
Israel, Radical Enlightenment: Philosophy and the Making 
of Modernity 1650-1750, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 
2001, ch.9 & 10. 
93 Israel, Radical Enlightenment, p.11. Israel gives an 
excellent account of the radical thinking of the period, 
particularly Dutch radicalism, and each of the three strands 
of the moderate enlightenment, noting that by the 1730s and 
1740s the European mainstream was espousing the ideas of 
Locke and Newton ‘which seemed uniquely suited to the 
moderate enlightenment purpose.’(p.11). Israel identifies the 
source of the radical enlightenment in Spinoza. Spinoza’s 
name was certainly used by opponents of the radical 
enlightenment to brand them as atheists or even nihilists, but 
Spinoza’s A Political Treatise was quite conservative, and 
his conception of nature mechanistic. (see reviews by 
Margaret C. Jacob and Anthony La Vopa in The Journal of 
Modern History, June, 2003, Vol.75, Issue 2, pp.387-393). It 
was Spinoza as reinterpreted in Germany from 1750 
onwards that became a focus of radicalism, that is, Spinoza 
reinterpreted through the pantheism of Toland et.al.. On this 
see John H. Zammito, ‘“The Most Hidden Conditions of 
Men of the First Rank”: The Pantheist Current in 
Eighteenth-Century Germany “Uncovered” by the 
Spinoza.Controversy’, Eighteenth Century Thought, Vol.1, 
2003, pp.335-368. 
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keeping alive and promoting the struggle for 
democratic republicanism.94  
In the early eighteenth century, however, it was 
not a proponent of democratic republicanism but 
an opponent who made the most original 
contribution to the tradition of civic humanism. 
This was Montesquieu. Montesquieu was a great 
admirer of the achievements of the English 
revolution, but had little sympathy for 
Harrington, let alone the more radical Levellers 
and nature enthusiasts. However, his main 
concern was to oppose the threat in France of 
despotism posed by Louis XIV, and he was 
fundamentally opposed to the ideas of Hobbes 
and those thinkers who had been influenced by 
him.95 Rejecting the Hobbesian notion of 
freedom, Montesquieu argued that ‘liberty can 
consist only in being able to do what one ought to 
will, and in not being constrained to do what one 
ought not to will.’96 He not only embraced but 
further developed the notion of separation of 
powers, arguing (following Bolingbroke) that 
there should be a separation of the legislative, 
executive and judicial arms of government in 
order to achieve a balance of power. Going far 
beyond any previous examination of the 
motivations of people and of the diversity of 
mores and customs, Montesquieu argued that 
‘Every nation is dominated by a general spirit, on 
which its very power is founded. Anything 
undertaken in defiance of that spirit is a blow 
against that power, and as such must necessarily 
come to a stop.’97 He argued that different kinds 
of governments are based on different ‘springs’: 
republican democracies and aristocracies require 
virtue to function, monarchies are based on the 
quest for honour, while despotisms are based on 
fear. In the modern world it is no longer possible 
to maintain the virtue needed for either 
democratic or aristocratic republics because 
countries are too large. But this absence of virtue 
does not matter in monarchies where people can 
be induced to act for the common good through 
their concern with honour. If monarchies embark 
on imperial ventures, however, then it is likely 
 
94 See Jacob, The Radical Enlightenment, chap.5. 
95 See Melvin Richter, The Political Theory of Montesquieu, 
London, Cambridge University Press, 1977, p.63. 
96 Montesquieu, ‘The Spirit of Laws’ Book XI, Chapter 3, in 
Richter, The Political Theory of Montesquieu, p.243. 
97 Montesquieu, ‘Considerations on the Causes of the 
Romans Greatness and Decline’, XIII, Richter, The Political 
Theory of Montesquieu, p.29. 
that they will be transformed into despotisms and 
fear will become the basis for organizing society. 
Montesquieu presented both a challenge and 
resources to those who wished to revive the quest 
for democracy. The most important figure in this 
regard was Rousseau (although as Israel points 
out, Rousseau was more indebted to Diderot than 
is usually appreciated).98 Rousseau embraced the 
idea that we are only free when we act morally 
which formed the basis of his notion of the 
‘general will’, the common will working for the 
common good. He argued we are only really free 
when we act according to the general will. This 
was a major modification of the notion of virtue 
and a strengthening of the notion of freedom and 
the relationship between freedom of the 
individual and freedom of the society of the civic 
humanists. Secondly, in order to sustain this 
common will Rousseau embraced Montesquieu’s 
notion of spirit and argued it is necessary to 
cultivate national customs and life-styles and so 
preserve the collective character of people’s 
nations. As he advised the Corsicans: ‘The first 
rule which we have to follow is that of national 
character: every people has, or must have, a 
character; if it lacks one, we must start by 
endowing it with one.’99 
Civic humanism was also revived in America, 
developed in reaction to the Whig government of 
Robert Walpole in Britain and had a major 
influence on the American Revolution.100 There 
were opposing tendencies among the 
revolutionaries, many being vehemently opposed 
to democracy. John Adams wrote, ‘I was always 
for a free republic, not a democracy, which is as 
arbitrary, tyrannical, bloody, cruel, and 
intolerable a government as Phalaris with his bull 
is represented to have been.’101 It was the civic 
humanism of Thomas Jefferson and others, not 
the philosophy of Locke, which inspired the 
 
98 Israel, The Radical Enlightenment, p.78. 
99 Rousseau, Projet Corse, 1915, II: 319, cited in Anthony 
D. Smith, Nationalism: Theory, Ideology, History, 
Cambridge, Polity Press, 2001, p.27. 
100 J.G.A. Pocock, ‘Civic Humanism and Its Role in Anglo-
American Thought’, in Politics, Language & Time: Essays 
on Political Thought and History, Chicago, University of 
Chicago Press, 1989, esp. p.97f. See also Tom Bailyn, The 
Ideological Origins of the American Revolution, enlarged 
ed. Cambridge, Mass., Belknap Press, 1992. 
101 Bailyn, The Ideological Origins of the American 
Revolution, p.282n.. 
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democratic elements of the US republic.102 
Echoing the Italian and English civic humanists, 
Jefferson took education to be central to 
democracy to avert the tendency towards 
despotism.103 Education was also seen by 
Jefferson as the condition of progress. ‘If the 
condition of man is to be progressively 
ameliorated,’ he argued, ‘education is to be the 
chief instrument for effecting it.’104 The Girouxs 
described this aspect of Jefferson’s thought: 
Jefferson’s vast educational plans for a free and 
universal, multi-tiered educational system 
including primary, grammar, and university 
training are central to his social and political 
thought. For Jefferson, education was the primary 
means for producing the mind of critically 
informed and active citizenry necessary to both 
nurture and sustain a democratic nation; he 
argued, in keeping with classical republican 
tradition, that democracy was the highest form of 
political organization for any nation because it 
provided the conditions for its citizens to grow 
both intellectually and morally through the 
exercise of these faculties.105  
Jefferson understood education in accordance 
with the tradition of civic humanism.106 
 
GERMANY, THE RADICAL ENLIGHTENMENT AND 
THE HUMBODTIAN UNIVERSITY 
It is against this background that it is necessary to 
understand the tradition of the German political 
thought derided by Castoriadis. The most 
important of this thought was a development of 
the radical enlightenment, the synthesis of civic 
humanism with nature enthusiasm, enriched by a 
critical engagement with Greek and Christian 
philosophy. Germany in the eighteenth and early 
nineteenth century was fragmented, still partly 
feudal and ruled by petty princes or kings, mostly 
French speaking. Germans were left behind by 
the dramatic political, social and intellectual 
developments taking place in Britain, Holland, 
 
102 This is not to say that civic humanists and followers of 
Locke formed to distinct camps. The quest for democracy 
and the defence of property tended to be confused. 
103 Giroux and Giroux, Take Back Higher Education, p.146. 
104 Ibid., p.148. 
105 Ibid., p.145. 
106 Although not consistently. See Eva T.H. Brann, 
‘Jeffersonian Ambivalences’, Philosophers of Education: 
New Historical Perspectives, ed. Amélie Oksenberg Rorty, 
London: Routledge, 1998, pp.273-283. 
America and France. But while looking on from a 
distance, they were in a position to assess the 
successes and failures of these developments and 
respond to them.  
Herder in particular embraced and developed the 
tradition of civic humanism while developing a 
general attack on the mechanistic view of nature 
(developed as a reformulation of Spinoza’s 
philosophy),107 atomic individualism and the 
utilitarianism of the ‘moderate’ enlightenment.108 
Having encountered Toland’s writings in the 
1770s, and through them, the work of Bruno,109 
Herder was the legitimate heir and the most 
important proponent of the radical enlightenment 
in the late eighteenth century. Echoing the ideas 
of the nature enthusiasts, he participated in laying 
the foundations for a new, post-Newtonian 
concept of nature as creative process,110 argued 
that humans are essentially social beings 
participating in this creativity, and promulgated 
an ethics of self-expression or self-realization, 
calling on nations and individuals to express the 
potentialities unique to them. He argued that 
geography formed the natural economy of a 
people, and that their customs and society would 
develop along the lines favoured by their basic 
environment. At the same time, he anticipated 
some of Castoriadis’ core ideas, arguing that ‘We 
 
107 Herder’s central and enormously influential work on 
natural philosophy is God, Some Conversations [1787], 
trans.Frederick H. Burkhardt, Indianapolis, 2003, 1940. 
108 See F.M. Barnard, Herder’s Social and Political 
Thought: From Enlightenment to Nationalism, Oxford, 
Clarendon Press, 1965 and Self-Direction and Political 
Legitimacy: Rousseau and Herder, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 
1988. Barnard argues that both Rousseau and Herder ‘fit 
into the tradition of civic humanism’ (Self-Direction and 
Political Legitimacy, p.1). See also Beiser, ‘The Political 
Theory of J.G. Herder’, Enlightenment, Revolution, and 
Romanticism, pp.189-221, and John H. Zammito, Kant, 
Herder, and the Birth of Anthropology, Chicago, University 
of Chicago Press, 2002. For some of Herder’s writings on 
politics, see Johann Gottfried Herder, Another Philosophy of 
History and Selected Political Writings, trans. and ed. 
Ioannis D. Evrigenis and Daniel Pellerin, Indianapolis, 
Hackett, 2004. On the political philosophy of the early 
romantics, strongly influenced by Herder, see The Early 
Political Writings of the German Romantics, ed. and trans. 
Frederick C. Beiser, Cambridge, Cambridge University 
Press, 1996 and Frederick C. Beiser, The Romantic 
Imperative: The Concept of Early Romanticism, Cambridge, 
Harvard University Press, 2003.  
109 See H.S. Nisbet, Herder and the Philosophy & History of 
Science, Cambridge, Modern Humanities Research 
Association, 1970, p.13. 
110 See Nisbet, Herder and the Philosophy & History of 
Science.  
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live in a world we ourselves create.’111 He was 
clearly a proponent of autonomy. Advancing 
beyond Montesquieu and Rousseau, he argued 
that each nation has its own culture, using this 
notion to refer to language, everyday practices 
and technology as well as art, literature, science 
and philosophy. The concept of ‘culture’ was 
central to his thinking, and Herder was the first 
philosopher to refer to ‘cultures’ in the plural. It 
is through culture that we create ourselves, 
Herder argued. In this regard, Herder regarded 
poetry as particularly important. ‘A poet is the 
creator of a people; he gives it a world to 
contemplate,’ he wrote, although at the same time 
he argued that the poet is to an equal extent 
created by the people.112 Poetry is ‘the expression 
of the highest aspirations’ of a nation.113 But as 
Isaiah Berlin noted, Herder ‘believed from the 
beginning to the end of his life that all men are 
some degree artists, and that all artists are, first 
and last, men – fathers, sons, friends, citizens, 
fellow worshippers, men united by common 
action.’114 He acknowledged the diversity of 
ways of life and the value of each of these. He 
was vehemently opposed to the arrogance of 
Europeans and their destructive colonization and 
exploitation of the rest of the world. Unlike 
Jefferson who, in accordance with the practices 
of Ancient Greece and Rome, accepted slavery 
and the subjugation of the American Indians, 
Herder was opposed to slavery and lauded the 
political organization of the Iroquois Indians.115  
While he is generally known as the theorist and 
proponent of national culture, what is not usually 
appreciated is the relation between this and 
Herder’s political philosophy. Herder was 
grappling with the problem of identifying the 
prime force for spontaneous political association 
which could overcome people’s short-sighted 
self-interest and motivate them to strive for 
liberty, which he characterized as ‘self-
 
111 Herder’s sämmliche Werke, ed. Bernhardt Suphan, 
Berlin, Weidemann, Vol.viii, p.252, cited and translated by 
Isaiah Berlin, Three Critics of the Enlightenment, Vico, 
Hamann, Herder, ed. Henry Hardy, London, Pimlico, 2000, 
p.229. 
112 Herder’s sämmliche Werke, Vol.viii, p.433, cited and 
translated by Isaiah Berlin, loc. cit. 
113 Johann Gottfried Herder, Against Pure Reason, trans. and 
ed. Marcia Bunge, Minneapolis, Fortress Press, p.143. 
114 Berlin, Three Critics of the Enlightenment, p.230. 
115 Herder, Philosophical Writings, p.400ff. 
determination’.116 His proposed answer, ‘culture’, 
was associated with his strong commitment to 
democracy, his view that reform must come from 
below, and that freedom of speech is necessary to 
expose ideas to criticism. Although it was not 
fully elaborated, it was Herder who originated the 
idea that the State should be an expression and 
instrument of the nation; a nation-State. The 
‘Westphalian State’ was to become a democratic 
nation-State. 
Based on this understanding of culture, Herder 
placed education at the centre of the effort to 
create a democratic society. He pinned his hopes 
on the emergence of popular leaders who would 
promote education and guide the rest of the 
nation to a stage where political rulers would no 
longer be necessary. In some sense he was 
continuing the traditional concern with education 
of the civic humanists, but in place of the study 
of the Greek and Roman classics as the basis for 
moving people to a commitment to the common 
good, Herder extolled the value of the literature, 
philosophy and science of each nation. This 
required not only the study of these subjects, but 
that as much as possible people participate in 
developing their culture, creating their own 
literature, philosophy and science. These should 
not be understood contemplatively. As early 
poetry was a spur to action, so should it be now, 
and so should science and philosophy. Herder, as 
Berlin pointed out, was ‘the originator of the 
doctrine of the unity of art and life, theory and 
practice.’117 In extolling the notion of culture as 
the medium through which people create 
themselves and their world, Herder redefined the 
meaning of education. He characterized 
education as Bildung, as self-forming in the 
context of tradition.118 ‘Bildung is to connote its 
original dynamic meaning of forming, shaping, 
or creating, of building up or rebuilding’ wrote 
Barnard, an expositor of Herder, while ‘tradition 
is to connote the consciously purposive activity 
 
116 Barnard, Herder’s Social and Political Thought, p.82. 
117 Berlin, Three Critics of the Enlightenment, p.230. 
118 On the concept of Bildung, its history and the way it has 
influenced education, see Erik Nordenbo, ‘Bildung and the 
Thinking of Bildung’, Journal of Philosophy of Education, 
Vol.36, No.3, 2003, pp.341-351. On how it was taken up 
and developed by the early Romantics who influenced von 
Humboldt, see Frederick C. Beiser, ‘A Romantic Education: 
The Concept of Bildung in Early German Romanticism’, in 
Philosophers on Education: New Historical Perspectives, 
ed. Amelie Oksenberg Rorty, London: Routledge, 1998, 
pp.284-299. 
 DEMOCRACY AND EDUCATION  
Concrescence 2005 Vol.6 pp. 3-27 ISSN 1445-4297 © Arran Gare, 2005. 
 
19
of handing down, of preserving as well as of 
determining a social and cultural heritage in its 
manifold complexion.’119 Education is self-
forming through creative appropriation and 
development of one’s culture, always understood 
in relation to people’s active engagement in the 
world and in society, preparatory to passing this 
culture on to the next generation. And through 
such self-formation through culture, Herder 
believed, people would be able to govern 
themselves. 
Herder had been a student of Kant, and although 
Kant did not have the same enthusiasm for 
democracy as Herder, he concurred in Herder’s 
belief in the value of education. Believing that 
the core of enlightenment is people thinking for 
themselves, Kant defended the need for open 
argument in the university, if nowhere else. In 
The Conflict of the Faculties he analysed the 
eternal combat between the supposedly lower 
faculty of philosophy with its commitment to 
reason and truth and the faculties of theology, 
law and medicine oriented to serving the interests 
of government.120 In the medieval university the 
Arts Faculty served to provide the basics for 
students going on to the law, medicine and 
theology faculties and they were not meant to 
engage in issues of theology or politics. Kant’s 
work strove to invert the status of the faculties, 
vindicating the ‘lower’ faculty and the right of its 
members to freedom of expression precisely 
because they were not mere instruments of the 
government.  
It was these ideas on education of Herder and 
Kant and those they influenced which inspired 
Wilhelm von Humboldt, the Prussian minister 
responsible for establishing the new University of 
Berlin, to redefine the meaning of ‘university’. 
Humboldt embraced the notion of education as 
Bildung. He characterized humans as beings who 
can be educated and characterized the ultimate 
aim of education as self-knowledge. ‘In order for 
an individual to extend and individuate his 
character’ von Humboldt wrote, ‘he must first 
know himself, in the fullest sense of the word. 
And, because of his intimate contact with all of 
his environment, not only know himself but also 
 
119 Barnard, Self-Direction and Political Legitimacy, p.173. 
120 Immanuel Kant, The Conflict of the Faculties, trans. 
Mary J. Gregor, University of Nebraska Press, 1992. 
his fellow citizens, his situation, his era.’121 
Ultimately, self-knowledge requires knowledge 
of world-history and the cosmos. Laying out the 
principles of the new university, Humboldt 
characterized the function of higher institutions 
as ‘places where learning in the deepest and 
widest sense of the word may be cultivated’. To 
attain their purpose, 
… the inward organization of these institutions 
must produce and maintain an uninterrupted 
cooperative spirit, one which again and again 
inspires its members, but inspires without forcing 
them and without specific intent to inspire. … It 
is a further characteristic of higher institutions of 
learning that they treat all knowledge as a not yet 
wholly solved problem and are therefore never 
done with investigation and research. This … 
totally changes the relationship between teacher 
and student from what is was when the student 
still attended school. In the higher institutions, 
the teacher no longer exists for the sake of the 
student; both exist for the sake of learning. 
Therefore the teacher’s occupation depends on 
the presence of his students. … The government, 
when it establishes such an institution must: 
 1) Maintain the activities of learning in 
their most lively and vigorous form and 
 2) Not permit them to deteriorate, but 
maintain the separation of the higher institutions 
from the schools … particularly from the various 
practical ones.122 
Philosophy was to be the core discipline of the 
university, providing an integrated perspective 
relating all the other disciplines. 
Von Humboldt was formulating for the first time 
the principle that universities cannot be mere 
instruments of the government without 
destroying them. If the government is to get what 
it wants from universities it has to respect their 
autonomy. It must confine itself to fostering 
vibrant communities of teachers and students, 
inspiring each other in their joint quest to 
understand themselves and the world. Above all, 
it is necessary to foster this spirit of inquiry. As 
von Humboldt argued: 
As soon as one stops searching for knowledge, or 
if one imagines that it need not be creatively 
sought in the depths of the human spirit but can 
be assembled extensively by collecting and 
classifying facts, everything is irrevocably and 
 
121 Wilhelm von Humboldt, Humanist Without Portfolio, 
Detroit, Wayne State University Press, 1963, p.125f. 
122 Humboldt , Humanist Without Portfolio, p.132f. 
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forever lost, lost for learning which soon 
vanishes so far out of the picture that it even 
leaves language behind like an empty pod ….123 
Von Humboldt argued that the aim of the State is 
to help people realize their nature as human 
beings. As Frederick Beiser wrote of his 
conclusions in this regard: 
The end of human beings is not happiness, 
however, still less the accumulation of property. 
Rather, it is the realization of their characteristic 
powers, the development of all intellectual, 
moral, and physical powers into a harmonious 
whole. … The state must be a Bildungsanstalt, an 
institution for the development of humanity.124 
Von Humboldt believed that everyone can 
achieve some form of Bildung; on no account 
was it to be seen as the privilege of the elite. Von 
Humboldt did wonder though whether Bildung 
could survive the growth of commerce. 
 
HEGEL’S POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 
One of the early appointments to the chair of 
philosophy at Berlin was Hegel. In developing 
his philosophy Hegel stood on the shoulders of 
Kant and Herder and their followers (most 
importantly Fichte and the young Romantics, 
including Schelling), developing a natural, social 
and political philosophy to challenge the tradition 
deriving from Hobbes, Newton, Locke and 
Bentham. It was Hegel more than anyone else 
who developed Herder’s ideas into a political 
philosophy able to counter this tradition.125 
Developing Rousseau’s ideas, Kant had argued 
that freedom is not freedom from constraint but 
limiting one’s actions in accordance with 
principles that one has judged to be 
universalizable. Fichte had reformulated Kant’s 
ethics to emphasise the sociality of the ego and of 
reason. ‘All individuals must be brought up to be 
human beings’ he proclaimed, arguing that one 
only becomes a free, self-conscious subject 
through being recognized as such by other free, 
self-conscious subjects.126 On this basis, Fichte 
 
123 Humboldt, Humanist Without Portfolio, p.134. 
124 Beiser, Enlightenment, Revolution, and Romanticism, 
p.131. 
125 As Charles Taylor argued in Hegel, Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press, 1976, ch.1 
126 J.G. Fichte, Foundations of Natural Right, trans. Michael 
Bauer, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2000, §3, 
p.38. 
argued that the fundamental principle of ethics 
must be ‘to limit your freedom so that the others 
around you can also be free’.127 He used this as a 
starting point to develop a political philosophy 
based on upholding human freedom, arguing that 
we have a primordial right to be free, that is, to 
be the cause of our actions rather than the effect 
of others’ actions. The foundation for the 
freedom of the citizens of Athenian Greece and 
Republican Rome, that which gave them the 
independence and time to participate in public 
life, had been landholdings worked by slaves. To 
provide the basis for freedom without slaves, 
Fichte argued that freedom must include the right 
to gainful and secure employment from which 
people are able to make a living.128 One of the 
functions of the State is to embody the common 
will and be the objective viewpoint from which 
to recognize the freedom and needs of each 
individual and judge the actions of its citizens. 
Along with its legislative, executive and judicial 
functions, Fichte argued that the State should also 
observe the various activities of the branches of 
the State and government to see whether they 
comply with the basic principles of ‘right’.129 
That is, the State should recognize and guarantee 
people’s freedom, including their freedom from 
economic insecurity, and recognize the 
significance of their role in society. 
Embracing and developing Fichte’s arguments, 
Hegel reformulated Herder’s ideas on culture and 
self-formation by conceiving ‘culture’ (although 
Hegel generally wrote of ‘spirit’ rather than 
‘culture’) as the medium through which people 
are recognized and then become free agents as 
well as the medium through which they work to 
transform nature and strive to represent the world 
to each other and to themselves. Hegel could now 
explain the advance of freedom as an outcome of 
the struggle for recognition, and he had identified 
the motive which could overcome people’s 
egocentric interests and inspire them to act for 
the common good: the quest for recognition. He 
had shown how we only become free persons 
through achieving mutual recognition in a free 
society and being educated to understand this. 
Hegel then characterized the whole of human 
 
127 Ibid., §10, p.102, as translated by Terry Pinkard, German 
Philosophy 1760-1860: The Legacy of Idealism, Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press, 2002, p.123.  
128 Fichte, Foundations of Natural Right, §19D, p.203. 
129 Ibid.,. §16, p.151. 
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history as a sequence of cultural formations (or 
forms of spirit) through which people have been 
recognized more and more adequately as free 
agents, culminating in the modern State where 
everyone is recognized as free. 
In developing his account of the modern State 
Hegel, building on Fichte’s work, was concerned 
to understand the achievements and also the 
problems of the past, particularly of France and 
Britain. He was centrally interested in exposing 
the illusions in the apparent success of Britain 
and working out an alternative social and 
political order.130 He argued that while the 
oligarchy of wealth based on self-interest had led 
to the flourishing of commerce, it had also led to 
excessive concentrations of wealth and reduced 
most people to day labourers or to an 
unemployed rabble, losing all sense of right, 
integrity and honour.131 The general population 
had become, as Marxists argued, wage-slaves, 
forced into dependence for their subsistence on 
the arbitrary will of another and incapable of 
enjoying the wider freedoms of civil society. 
Hegel concluded: 
England which, because private persons have a 
predominant share in public affairs, has been 
regarded as having the freest of all constitutions. 
Experience shows that that country – as 
compared with the other civilized States of 
Europe – is the most backward in civil and 
criminal legislation, in the law and liberty of 
property, in arrangements for art and science, and 
that objective freedom or rational right is rather 
sacrificed to formal right and particular private 
interest.132 
But France had not provided an alternative. It 
was clear to Hegel that there was no possibility of 
achieving freedom through making people 
conform to the general will conceived as the 
result of a contract, as Rousseau had proposed 
and the French had attempted to achieve in the 
 
130 That Hegel was not merely describing reality but was 
putting forward ideas to solve problems, disguising what he 
was doing to avoid censorship, has become increasingly 
evident. On this see Stephen Houlgate, Freedom, Truth and 
History, London, Routledge, 1991, esp.104-119. 
131 Hegel The Elements of the Philosophy of Right, trans. 
H.B. Nisbet, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1991, 
§244 
132 Hegel’s Philosophy of Mind, trans. William Wallace, 
Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1971, §544, p.273. 
French revolution. The result was, inevitably, 
terror.133 
To overcome such problems Hegel argued for a 
social order which gave a place to the market or 
‘civil society’ in which people pursued their own 
interests, but treated this as only one domain 
which must be circumscribed and checked by 
other domains. Hegel argued for not only a 
division of powers between the legislative, 
judicial and administrative branches of 
government, but a plurality of autonomous 
institutions checking the power of each other in 
which people could engage, achieve recognition 
and realize their freedom. To begin with, the 
family as the institution in which people achieved 
immediate recognition in a relationship of love, 
should not be conceived in economic terms. Civil 
society in which the market, dominated by self-
interest, operated, was acknowledged but was 
treated not as a natural order of things but a 
particular institutional structure based on the 
recognition of rights to property. Such 
recognition implies a system of law standing 
above such self-interest and above the market. 
Hegel acknowledged, as the economists had 
done, that in this domain self-interest worked for 
the common good, but only up to a point.134 
Without guild corporations, employers in 
England and Scotland (where trade unions were 
illegal until 1824) were able to lower wages to 
such an extent that the economy suffered from 
under-consumption, driving civil society to seek 
markets elsewhere and to colonize other 
countries.135 To overcome this problem Hegel 
defended the Corporation as an institution able to 
provide the family with a stable basis in the sense 
that it could ensure its members a livelihood and 
gain recognition for its members’ needs, abilities 
and their contribution to society.136 This would 
provide their members with an identity as people 
of significance, as part of a whole which is itself 
an organ of the entire society, enabling them to 
 
133 Hegel, The Elements of the Philosophy of Right, §258, 
p.276.. 
134 Ibid., §243, p.266. 
135 Ibid., §246, p.267f. 
136 Ibid., §253, p.271. This is a contentious claim, since in 
the past interpreters of Hegel assumed that he was merely 
describing different kinds of people in society. This is 
almost certainly a misinterpretation. See Robert R. 
Williams, Hegel’s Ethics of Recognition, Berkeley, 
University of California Press, 1997, p.251 for a discussion 
of this issue.  
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promote with comparative disinterest the ends of 
this whole. Hegel noted that when Corporations 
break down and people are reduced to mere self-
seeking, they will strive to gain recognition 
through external proofs of success to which no 
limits can be set. That is, Hegel had recognized 
conspicuous consumption as a disease of a 
defective society. 
Beyond the Corporation is the State. The State 
was characterized by Hegel as the unification of 
the family principle with that of civil society.137 
The State ‘as the spirit of a nation [Volk] is both 
the law which permeates all relations within it 
and also the customs and consciousness of the 
individuals who belong to it.’138 It is the 
embodiment of the universal aspect of the 
society, the common good in which recognition 
of the significance of each individual and each 
institution is objectified; the organization of the 
whole, differentiated into particular agencies 
concerned to produce the whole as a result. The 
government is that part of the State ‘which 
intentionally aims at preserving those parts, but at 
the same time gets hold of and carries out those 
general aims of the whole which rise above the 
function of the family and civil society.’139 The 
government itself should consist of a plurality of 
partly autonomous institutions. As Hegel argued: 
The one essential canon to make liberty deep and 
real is to give every business belonging to the 
general interests of the State a separate 
organization wherever they are essentially 
distinct. Such real division must be: for liberty is 
only deep when it is differentiated in all its 
fullness and these differences manifested in 
existence.140 
Hegel’s State was to consist of a constitutional 
monarchy, an elected bi-cameral assembly, local 
self-government and a powerful civil service. The 
employees of the State are its public officials or 
civil servants. As a consequence of his position, 
the civil servant’s appointment ‘provides him 
with resources … and frees his external situation 
and official activity from other kinds of 
subjective dependence and influence.’141 Hegel 
 
137 Hegel’s Philosophy of Mind, §535, p.263. 
138 Hegel, The Elements of the Philosophy of Right, §274, 
p.312. 
139 Hegel’s Philosophy of Mind, §541, p.269. 
140 Loc.cit. 
141 Hegel, The Elements of the Philosophy of Right, §294, 
p.333. 
proclaimed ‘that the service of the State requires 
those who perform it to sacrifice the independent 
and discretionary satisfaction of their subjective 
ends, and thereby gives them the right to find 
their satisfaction in the performance of their 
duties’.142 
Hegel only made sporadic comments about 
education, but it is clear that for the most part he 
endorsed Herder’s exalted notion of education as 
Bildung, self-formation through appropriating, 
developing and passing on a tradition, making it 
possible for people to govern themselves, 
Fichte’s claim that ‘[a]ll individuals must be 
educated into being persons, otherwise they 
would not be persons’,143 and von Humboldt’s 
redefinition of the university as an institution 
which can only function properly insofar as its 
autonomy is maintained.144 He differed from 
these predecessors, particularly in his later 
philosophy, in according less significance to 
individuality. As one interpreter of Hegel noted, 
he held that education ‘consists fundamentally in 
disciplining what is particular or individual in the 
human personality so that it conforms to what is 
universal … developing the capacities to rise 
above mere feeling and intuitions, to think in 
conceptual terms which can be articulated and 
rationally defended in discourse.’145 However, it 
is likely that the autonomy of the university 
defended by von Humboldt was Hegel’s model 
for defending autonomy for a plurality of 
institutions within the State and its government as 
the condition for real liberty. But universities 
have a privileged place among such 
organizations. It is through education that people 
are formed as self-forming subjects with an 
understanding of the internal relationships 
between all the parts of the State to each other 
and to the whole. Since the universal also means 
‘what is rationally recognized as valid and 
binding in the social order’ education ‘is 
therefore also the development of the capacity 
 
142 Loc.cit. 
143 Fichte, Foundations of Natural Right, §3, p.38 as 
translated by Terry Pinkard, German Philosophy 1760-1860: 
The Legacy of Idealism, Cambridge, Cambridge University 
Press, 2002, p.121. 
144 See Alan W. Wood, ‘Hegel on Education’ in 
Philosophers on Education, ed. Rorty, pp.300-317; and  
Nigel Tubb, ‘Hegel’s Educational Theory and Practice’, 
British Journal of Educational Studies, vol.44, no.2, June 
1996, pp.181-199. 
145 Wood, ‘Hegel on Education’, p.313. 
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and disposition to conform to the rational 
demands of social life.’146 Universities produce 
the people who can understand and commit 
themselves to upholding and advancing freedom 
and the quest for truth and the institutions which 
objectify and sustain this quest. They provide the 
standpoint from which those engaged in inquiry 
are able to advance people’s understanding not 
only of themselves, their society and their era, 
but of human history and the cosmos and our 
place within it. In Hegel’s terminology, the 
universities are the objective standpoint from 
which Absolute Spirit is able to see that ‘the 
History of the World is nothing but the 
development of the Idea of Freedom.’147 
 
GERMAN PHILOSOPHY AND THE REVIVAL OF THE 
STRUGGLE FOR DEMOCRACY 
What I have presented here is a very schematic 
account of some of the central ideas of Herder, 
Kant, von Humboldt and Hegel which, as 
Germany became the intellectual centre of the 
world in the nineteenth century, had an enormous 
influence throughout the world.148 These are the 
ideas which, advancing the radical 
enlightenment, formed the core of the opposition 
to the tradition of thought deriving from Hobbes, 
Newton and Locke. They underlie the notions of 
national culture, the formation of subjects of the 
State and education associated with the 
Humboldtian University (and education 
generally) explicated by Readings. As opposed to 
the Hobbesian tradition of political philosophy 
with its focus on protecting property, increasing 
wealth, maximizing pleasure and keeping people 
under control, the tradition of radical 
enlightenment as it had been developed in 
Germany and interpreted elsewhere upheld a 
notion of the good life as self-actualization 
through participating in an autonomous, 
democratic nation-State committed to social 
justice and economic security for its members to 
enable them to participate in community life and 
develop their full potential as humans. By 
 
146 Loc.cit. 
147 Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, The Philosophy of 
History, trans. J. Sibree, New York, Dover, p.456. 
148 On its influence on Great Britain and Australia, mainly 
through the philosophy of T.H. Green, see Marian Sawer, 
‘The Ethical State: Social Liberalism and the Critique of 
Contract’, Australian Historical Studies, April, 2000, 
Vol.31, Issue 115, 67-90. 
presenting these notions as simultaneously a 
development of the radical enlightenment 
concerned with autonomy, democracy, liberty, 
self-determination and freedom, and as a 
response to the opposition to this tradition with 
roots going back to Hobbes, it should now be 
clearer what is at stake in the dissolution of the 
nation-State and of the Humboldtian University. 
In the past this opposition has been somewhat 
confused by labels. Orthodox Marxists, claiming 
inspiration from Marx, interpreted his work from 
a Hobbesian perspective and, perversely ignoring 
the subtitle of him major work, Capital, Kritik 
der politischen Oekonomie, defended classical 
economics against neo-classical economics. As 
such, while appearing to be defenders of the 
radical enlightenment, they became major 
proponents of the Hobbesian tradition of 
thought.149 John Stuart Mill, on the other hand, 
while still proclaiming himself a utilitarian, 
became one of the most influential proselytizers 
of the ideas of the radical enlightenment.150 In 
hindsight it can now be seen that the opposition 
between the moderate enlightenment with its 
Hobbesian roots and the democratically oriented 
radical enlightenment is more important than the 
opposition between ‘right’ and ‘left’ - the defence 
of privilege versus egalitarianism. Democracy 
implies an egalitarian community. Claims to 
support democracy without addressing 
inequalities of wealth and income are a sham, but 
so also are commitments to egalitarianism 
without commitment to democracy. Both 
orthodox Marxists and utilitarian proponents of 
the welfare State have betrayed the poor they 
purported to represent. Neoliberals, orthodox 
Marxists and orthodox Fabian socialists have 
become almost identical; the real opposition to 
oppression comes from those committed to 
 
149 On the perversion of Marx’s ideas by orthodox Marxists, 
see James D. White, Karl Marx and the Intellectual Origins 
of Dialectical Materialism, Houndmills, Macmillan, 1996. 
150 Apart from particular arguments, the familiarity with and 
influence of German philosophy is evident in a series of 
articles published in 1830 entitled The Spirit of the Age, the 
quote from Wilhelm von Humboldt with which Mill begins 
his most famous essay, On Liberty, his argument against 
‘benevolent despotism’ in On Representative Government 
and his essay on ‘Coleridge’ (see The Six Great Humanistic 
Essays of John Stuart Mill, New York, Washington Square 
Press, 1963, pp.73-126). On Mill’s indebtedness to Herder 
and von Humboldt, see Barnard, Herder’s Social and 
Political Thought, p.167f. Mill’s indebtedness to civic 
humanism is evident in The Subjection of Women. 
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democracy, the heirs of the radical 
enlightenment. 
While the Hobbesian tradition, elaborated as 
Darwinism and Social Darwinism, defined 
progress as the domination of the entire world 
though commerce enabling the strong to triumph 
over the weak and backward, the tradition of 
radical enlightenment upheld the intrinsic value 
of diverse cultures and justified the independence 
of nations to pursue their own ends.151 As F.M. 
Barnard described Herder’s political philosophy: 
Herder’s principal political idea was the 
transformation of a world of ‘mechanical’ 
dynastic States into one of ‘organic’ nation-
States, based on the principle of self-
determination. This vision presupposed … the 
realization of certain requirements both within 
States and in international relations generally 
during a period of transition, to which Herder 
applied the term ‘humanization’. … [H]e 
conceived national and international 
enlightenment as two complementary aspects of a 
single process.152 
It was the principles of this tradition which were 
partially realized with the development of the 
social democratic State and with the League of 
Nations and then the United Nations; it is 
tradition deriving from Hobbes and Locke that is 
now moving towards realization in efforts of the 
‘coalition of the willing’ to undermine the nation-
State, to either reduce the United Nations to an 
instrument of the powerful or to debunk it, and to 
impose market relations on every facet of life in 
every country throughout the world. The 
Hobbesian tradition construes nature as a 
mechanical order of matter in motion to be 
mastered and controlled by biological organisms 
in their struggle for survival, while the radical 
enlightenment tradition and its allies (which 
included the English Romantics and the 
American transcendentalists as well as those 
influenced by German philosophy) is associated 
 
151 The tradition deriving from Herder also had enormous 
influence in anthropology and the defence of ‘primitive’ 
societies. It should be noted that despite a veneer of German 
Romanticism, the Nazis were part of the Hobbesian tradition 
of thought, being racists rather than nationalists. As Anthony 
Smith, the foremost theorist of nationalism pointed out, ‘The 
purest contradiction of nationalism in toto is Nazism.’  
While appearing ‘to be an extreme development of 
“ethnocentric” nationalism’ it ‘is founded on an altogether 
different principle.’ (Anthony D. Smith, Theories of 
Nationalism, London, Duckworth, 1971, p.262). 
152 Barnard, Herder’s Social and Political Thought, p.99. 
with a post-mechanistic organic conception of 
nature that gave rise to the discipline of ecology. 
It is this tradition which underlies the global 
environmental movement. 
It should be evident that both Readings’ and 
Castoriadis’ interpretations of the German 
tradition of philosophy were misleading. Hegel 
was not celebrating existing institutions as 
Castoriadis claimed; he was criticizing them, 
most importantly, the institutional forms of early 
nineteenth century Britain that are now being 
revived by neo-liberals. Hegel’s State did give a 
significant place to the private realm and did 
allow a distinction between the governors and the 
governed, as Castoriadis complained. But Hegel, 
building on the  tradition of civic humanism and 
Herder’s philosophy, was trying to reformulate 
the notion of autonomy to make it practically 
relevant to the modern world with its much larger 
social entities, something that Castoriadis never 
really did. Hegel accepted a mixed constitution in 
which ‘the imperium of the laws is greater than 
that of any other men’. In Hegel’s mixed 
constitution democracy had only a limited 
place,153 but those he influenced modified his 
philosophy to give democracy a far greater 
place.154  
Castoriadis did have a valid point to make against 
some German philosophers that they were 
committed to determinism and thereby rendering 
the notion of autonomy meaningless, as with 
Hegel portraying history as the progression of the 
world-spirit or Reason in which people, moved 
by their passions, are mere instruments.155 This 
does seem to uphold a form of heteronomy, 
presenting institutions not as the creation of a 
people but as having their source outside them. 
Even Herder portrayed history as the growing-up 
of humanity in which some notion of progress 
seemed to be taken for granted rather than 
something achieved by people. But a close 
reading of Hegel suggests that he only regarded 
broad trends as inevitable, and did not assume 
that the political form that he was defending must 
inevitably be realized.156 More importantly, most 
 
153 On just how much committed to democracy Hegel was, 
see Frederick Beiser, Hegel, New York, Routledge, 2005, 
p.256ff. 
154 See John Edward Toews, Hegelianism, Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press, 1980.  
155 Castoriadis, World in Fragments, p.35. 
156 See for instance Beiser, Hegel, p.222f. and, on the 
cunning of reason, p.267ff. 
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of those inspired by these German philosophers 
(Marx in his later years and neo-Marxists, 
hermeneuticists, pragmatists, existentialists and 
process philosophers) abandoned determinism. 
Castoriadis’ own opposition to determinism was 
strongly influenced by the advance in these 
traditions of thought emerging from German 
philosophy.157  
To be made a subject of the State by the 
education system did not mean ‘being subjected 
to the idea of the state’, but being developed as 
an autonomous person with the means to evaluate 
and criticize what is actual. The State as 
conceived by Hegel is not something separate 
from people to which they had to be subordinated 
but the set of institutions and roles organized to 
inspire people and to enable people so inspired to 
work for the common good of the nation and of 
humanity and to be recognized for what they are 
doing. People as subjects of the State are not 
merely the effects of the State; they are the 
people continually challenged to produce the 
State through which they can then define 
themselves as its ‘subjects’, that is, as its citizens. 
And the nation is not something which simply is; 
it is a project to create a community of memory 
and a community of hope and to help realize this 
through a territorial State.158 It is the State as 
conceived by Herder and Hegel in which the 
nation is realized as a community which later 
came to be referred to as the nation-State. The 
development of the nation-State, the idea of the 
State deriving from Herder and Hegel, was 
central to the development of democracy and to 
the growth of autonomy, reaching a peak in the 
third quarter of the twentieth century. 
When this political philosophy is properly 
understood it becomes possible to properly 
appreciate the Humboldtian University not only 
as a central institution of the nation-State but also 
as central to democracy. Based on the notion of 
culture and reflecting a deeper appreciation of the 
relationship between individuals, cultures, 
societies and freedom than had been achieved by 
the civic humanists, it was an advance over the 
kind of education called for by Jefferson, 
although it was committed to much the same 
 
157 This is evident in Castoriadis, ‘Time and Creation’ in 
World in Fragments, pp.374-401 despite opening references 
to Aristotle. 
158 As David Carr argued in Time, Narrative, and History, 
Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 1991, p.138ff. 
ends. It should now be evident that Readings had 
a more profound understanding of the modern 
university than the Girouxs, appreciating more 
clearly than they the extent to which education 
was designed to form people as members of 
communities, not merely to equip them with the 
means to protest against those in positions of 
power. It should also be evident, however, that 
Readings still did not appreciate the connection 
between nation-States and democracy and the 
democratic impetus behind the German notion of 
the State as a nation-State and the Humboldtian 
University. 
Partly, this can be explained by the compromised 
state of the Humboldtian University prior to the 
present crisis. In essence, the Humboldtian 
University combined teaching and research 
creating a community of academics and students 
committed to inquiry, and the Arts and Science 
Faculties were the core of the university by virtue 
of their relatively disinterested commitment to 
rationality and pursuit of truth. They were 
supposed to work towards providing people with 
a coherent world-view as a means to understand 
themselves and their place in the world. But in 
Anglophone countries, as Readings noted, 
literature was granted an inordinate role in the 
creation of national subjects, as opposed to 
Humboldt’s original idea of the university in 
which philosophy was the discipline which 
played the pre-eminent role, and natural 
philosophy, what later became the natural 
sciences, was just as important as literature as a 
component of culture. In fact it was not simply a 
matter of science being understood as technology 
in Anglophone countries as Readings suggested; 
within Anglophone universities there has been a 
continual struggle between two opposing 
conceptions of the world and of humanity, one 
deriving from the tradition of Hobbes, Newton 
and Locke which has dominated the natural 
sciences (although there has been an increasingly 
strong opposition to this) and those human 
sciences based on this tradition, notably classical 
and neo-classical economics and mainstream 
psychology, the other with their roots in the 
culture of the Renaissance and late eighteenth 
century and early nineteenth century German 
philosophy dominating the humanities (with the 
exception of mainstream analytic philosophy) 
and humanistic social sciences (including 
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historical and institutional economics).159 The 
conflict between these two traditions has 
underpinned two major opposing political 
influences, the first anti-democratic, the second 
democratic. In general, the Hobbesian tradition 
has prevailed, overwhelming the humanistic 
social sciences and reducing much of the 
humanities to the consumption of ‘high culture’. 
The triumph of neo-classical economics to a 
position where it has now replaced both ethics 
and political philosophy and, through ‘rational 
choice theory’ is attempting to redefine 
rationality itself, is the core of public policy 
formation in both neo-liberal and neo-
conservative governments, is the ultimate 
triumph of the Hobbesian tradition of thought. 
Much of the impetus to destroy the Humboldtian 
University came from within the university. 
Within the natural sciences, however, the 
Hobbesian tradition has been losing ground to 
post-mechanistic traditions upholding a view of 
nature as consisting of self-organizing, creative 
processes, particularly in physics160 and 
biology161, creating what Ilya Prigogine and 
Isabelle Stengers called ‘the new alliance’ 
between science and the humanities.162 These 
developments have been associated with the 
revival of metaphysics within philosophy, most 
importantly, process metaphysics, reasserting for 
itself the role for philosophy called upon by the 
Humboldtian University, supporting these 
developments in the sciences and supporting this 
new alliance.163 The new alliance, vindicating 
and advancing the radical enlightenment’s 
philosophy of nature and social philosophy, 
should have supported democracy and 
strengthened the Humboldtian University. The 
present efforts to control universities more 
effectively has been partly in response to this, 
 
159 As shown in Geoffrey M. Hodgson, How Economics 
Forgot History, London, Routledge, 2001. 
160 For a popular exposition on such ideas, see David Bohm, 
Science, Order, and Creativity, 2nd ed. London, Routledge, 
2000. 
161 See for instance Gerry Webster and Brian Goodwin, 
Form and Transformation: Generative and Relational 
Principles in Biology, Cambridge, Cambridge University 
Press, 1996, and Stanley N. Salthe Development and 
Evolution, Cambridge Mass., MIT Press, 1993. 
162 Ilya Prigogine and Isabelle Stengers, Order Out of 
Chaos, Toronto: Bantam Books, 1984, p.xxixf. 
163 See Nicholas Rescher, Process Metaphysics, New York, 
SUNY Press, 1996. See also the SUNY Series, Constructive 
Postmodern Thought, ed. David Ray Griffin. 
attempting to characterize science as nothing but 
a means to develop technology and to more 
effectively control the activities of scientists and 
in some cases to get rid of the humanities 
altogether. This can only be understood as part of 
the effort to undermine the mission of the 
Humboldtian University to educate people to be 
self-governing, part of the drive for economic 
globalization and the drive to undermine the core 
institutions upholding the nation-State as an 
autonomous democratic community.164  
But the battle is not over. Economic globalization 
associated with neo-liberalism and neo-
conservatism not only threatens the destruction of 
democracy and the impoverishment of vast 
numbers of people; it threatens the global eco-
system and the future of humanity. It is now 
becoming apparent that people throughout the 
world are rallying around the banner of 
democracy to oppose neo-liberalism, neo-
conservatism and economic and corporate 
globalization. The nature of this economic 
globalization is now much better understood. It is 
dominated by transnational corporations legally 
recognized as persons with far greater rights but 
almost none of the responsibilities of ordinary 
people.165 These are penetrating and taking 
control of the institutions of the nation-State, 
creating a new kind of State which is no longer a 
nation-State but an apparatus to facilitate 
penetration of all facets of life by the market 
while keeping the losers under control.166 David 
Korten in his book When Corporations Rule the 
World characterized this as ‘a market tyranny that 
is extending its reach across the planet like a 
cancer, colonizing ever more of the planet’s 
living spaces, destroying livelihoods, displacing 
people, rendering democratic institutions 
impotent, and feeding on life in an insatiable 
quest for money.’167 Later, drawing on Mae-Wan 
Ho’s post-mechanistic biological theories, he 
 
164 Not that this is formulated as a conscious intention; it is 
an alignment of careerists with a feel for the game, aware 
that to get on they must serve those who have most power, 
so that, as Pierre Bourdieu put it, ‘strings of’ ”moves” … are 
objectively organized as strategies without being the product 
of a genuine strategic intention’ (The Logic of Practice, 
trans. Richard Nice, Cambridge, Polity Press, 1990, p.62). 
165 See Joel Bakan, The Corporation: The Pathological 
Pursuit of Profit and Power, London, Constable, 2004. 
166 See William I Robinson, A Theory of Global Capitalism, 
Baltimore, John Hopkins University Press, 2004, p.94. 
167 David C. Korten, When Corporations Rule the World, 
West Hartford, Kumarian Press, 1995. p.12. 
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noted that the reference to capitalism as a cancer 
is ‘less a metaphor than a clinical diagnosis of a 
pathology to which market economies are prone 
in the absence of adequate citizen and 
government oversight.’168  
While many of the non-democratic left have 
joined this pathology, embracing economic 
globalization (or simply denying the possibility 
of opposing it), there has been a convergence 
between those still committed to gaining 
democratic control over the economy on what 
must be done. Essentially, as Herman Daly and 
John Cobb argued, the world needs to be 
organized as communities of communities 
subordinating the market to the quest for the 
common good, with power devolved downwards 
as much as possible to local communities.169 The 
nation-State has a central place in this. Those 
whose thinking is closest to Castoriadis, the 
libertarian socialists, who have always been most 
committed to democracy but skeptical of the 
nation-State, are appreciating the need to defend 
and reform institutions of the nation-State in 
conjunction with efforts to develop local 
participatory democracy.170 Communists in 
Kerala, India, and Swedish social democrats, who 
have traditionally upheld a major role for the 
nation-State, are now calling for participatory 
democracy to complement State control of the 
economy.171 Attacking the ‘Globalism’ of neo-
liberals, John Ralston Saul, following Hedley 
Bull, has called for a ‘system of overlapping 
authority and multiple loyalty’. He has presented 
a vision of Europe as ‘a continent of peoples, 
separate and interwoven’ rather than dissolved 
into a union, and called for a revival of ‘positive’ 
 
168 David C. Korten, The Post-Corporate World: Life After 
Capitalism, West Hartford, Kumarian Press, 1999, p.15.  
169 Herman E. Daly and John B. Cobb, Jr., For the Common 
Good: Redirecting the Economy toward Community, the 
Environment, and a Sustainable Future, 2nd ed. Boston, 
Beacon Press, 1994, Introduction and ch.9. 
170 See Robin Hahnel, Economic Justice and Democracy, 
New York: Routledge, 2005, esp. p.280ff. Takis 
Fotopoulous, however, believes that nothing can be salvaged 
from the nation-State. See ‘The Inclusive Democracy project 
– A rejoinder’, The International Journal of Inclusive 
Democracy, Issue 3, 2005, pp.1-45. 
171 On Kerala, see Hahnel, Economic Justice and 
Democracy, p.359ff. On Swedish social democracy see 
Magnus Ryner, Capitalist Restructuring, Globalization and 
the Third Way: Lessons from the Swedish Model, London, 
Routledge, 2002. 
nationalism.172 Such a strategy is being 
successfully pursued in South American by 
Venezuela which provides a model for the world. 
Looking back for inspiration to the liberator of 
South America, Simon Bolivar, nationalism has 
been revived along with direct democracy, using 
the power base generated by this direct 
democracy to overcome the corruption of the 
institutions of State and to reclaim them for the 
nation. At the same time Venezuela has promoted 
an extended Latin American nationalism to create 
a South American community which will be able 
to protect the democracy of nation-States while 
calling for the democratization of the United 
Nations.173  
It is clear that in the coming struggle between 
proponents of corporate globalization and 
proponents of democracy that a major 
battleground will be over control of the 
institutions of the State, including schools and 
universities. It is not enough to live in the ruins of 
the Humboldtian University. The Humboldtian 
University should be fought for and brought back 
to life. However, it is unlikely that this will be 
achieved except by upholding the radical 
enlightenment, now advancing as the new 
alliance between the sciences and the humanities 
underpinned by process metaphysics. On this 
basis, we can then reaffirm Alfred North 
Whitehead’s proclamation: ‘The task of a 
university is the creation of the future, so far as 
rational thought, and civilized modes of 
appreciation, can affect the issue.’174 
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Reinvention of the World, Camberwell: Penguin, 2005, 
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173 Given the importance of nationalism in this struggle and 
the contempt for nationalism by the cosmopolitan left, it is 
worth noting that Anthony D. Smith, as noted, one of the 
foremost theorists of nationalism, concluded one of his more 
recent books with the argument that ‘the nation and 
nationalism remain the only realistic basis for a free society 
of states in the modern world.’ (Nations and Nationalism in 
a Global Era, Cambridge, Polity Press, 1995, p.147). 
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